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ARTICLES
NAFTA Chapter 11-"Direct Effect" and
Interpretive Method: Lessons from
Methanex v. United States
PROFESSOR ALAN C. SWANt

I.

INTRODUCTION

This essay concerns Methanex v. United States,' an arbitral decision under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).
Methanex is a Canadian company with two U.S. subsidiaries. It is
the world's largest producer of methanol.' In molecular structure, meth-

anol is an alcohol that, when reacted with isobutylene, provides the oxygen in MTBE, an ether. MTBE is then added to gasoline to form what is
known as "reformulated gasoline." Under federal law, only reformulated
gasoline with a specified oxygen content can be sold in designated urban
areas with high levels of air pollution. Until banned, MTBE with methanol as its oxygen base, was the "oxygenate of choice" in California and
elsewhere in the United States.3 However, when traces of MTBE were
found in groundwater, lakes, and reservoirs throughout California (principally due to leakage in underground gas station tanks) and when scientific studies by the University of California' confirmed MTBE as a
t Professor Swan was working on this piece at the time of his passing. The University of
Miami Law Review is publishing it to honor his memory and academic legacy. We have made
every effort to preserve the original voice and meaning of the work, but we have not attempted to
finish it. Any incompleteness of research is intentional. We want it to serve as a portrait of his
work before he passed. The piece is meant to be a tribute to his life, his dedication, and his love
for legal academia. He was an intellectual giant in his field and in our school, and he will be sorely
missed.
1. Methanex Corp. v. United States, 44 I.L.M. 1345 (2005).
2. Methanex controls about seventeen percent of the global productive capacity of methanol
Id. at 1368.
3. Id. at 1411. Neither the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1995 that introduced the
requirement of reformulated gasoline (RFG) nor the EPA regulations requires the use of particular
oxygenates. The requirement instead is for a stipulated oxygen content by weight, leaving it up to
producers to chose the oxygenate. By 1999, while both MTBE and ethanol were being used in the
production of reformulated gasoline, about eighty-seven percent of the oxygenate used was
MTBE, largely by reason of cost, superior blending characteristics, and ease of transport.
4. California Senate Bill 521, enacting the MTBE Public Health and Environment Protection
Act of 1997, signed into law October 8, 1997, directed the University of California to conduct
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threat to California's water supply,5 the State issued a total ban on the
sale of gasoline with MTBE. The ban was effective December 31, 2003.
Methanex responded by challenging the California ban in two separate

damage claims totaling $970 million under NAFTA Chapter 11.6

Chapter 11 confers on an investor from one NAFTA member with
an investment in another the right to sue the latter in an arbitral proceeding for violating any rights conferred on the investor by that Chapter.7
The suit is under either the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) or United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) rules, damages are the only remedy, and
damage awards are enforceable under the New York Convention. 8 Bor-

rowing from European Union parlance we call this feature of Chapter 11
a grant of "direct effect" to investor rights. 9
research "assess[ing] the risks and benefits to human health and the environment of MTBE...
compar[ing] those risks and benefits to ETBE, TAME, and ethanol." The California Bill
appropriated $500,000 for that purpose. Methanex, 44 I.L.M. at 1410.
5. Id.at 1411.
6. Id. at 1345.
7. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
(1993). The rights in question include "national treatment," (Article 1102), most-favored-nation
treatment (Article 1103), freedom-from-specified-performance requirements (Article 1106), a
prohibition on limiting the nationality of top management (Article 1107), and a prohibition on
expropriating an investor's property, including any measure "tantamount" to an expropriation,
unless for a public purpose accompanied by compensation (Article 1110). In addition, all
investment earnings must be freely transferable in hard currency (Article 1109). Id. arts.
1102-1103, 1106-1107, 1110.
8. Note also that the ICSID Convention requires that national courts enforce ICSID damage
awards issued against ICSID members. However, of the three NAFTA members, only the United
States is a signatory to the ICSID Convention. This means that the ICSID arbitral rules can apply
solely by operation of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules. Those rules, in turn, apply only in
cases where one of the nation-states consenting to the arbitration is signatory to the ICSID
Convention itself (i.e., only in cases brought by a U.S. investor against either Mexico or Canada or
by a Mexican or Canadian investor against the United States). Cases brought by Canadian
investors against Mexico and Mexican investors against Canada must proceed under the
UNCITRAL rules. No provision is made in the Additional Facility Rules for domestic court
enforcement of ICSID arbitral awards. In all cases, however, arbitral damage awards can be
enforced under the New York Convention, to which all three NAFTA members are signatory. See
generally INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INv. DisPUTs, ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS,
AND RULES 73-128 (2006) (laying out the rules), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
ICSID/RulesMain.jsp.
9. The seminal learning on "direct effect" is to be found in the work of the European Court
of Justice (ECJ) pursuant to the EU treaties. Under those treaties, select treaty provisions may be
the basis of individual suits against nation-state parties by actions in the national courts, with an
appeal to the European Court of Justice. No provision is made for the submission of claims to
special international tribunals like those established by NAFTA. For the present, however, while
we are borrowing the European terminology, we must exercise great care in drawing parallels
between Chapter 11 and the EU experience. The latter arises out of a unique political context that
differs in marked respects from that in which the international economic system, including
NAFTA, seen from a global perspective, now operates. As the ECJ in its seminal decision in the
van Gend & Loos Case put it:

2009]

NAFTA CHAPTER 11-"DIRECT EFFECT"

In its first claim, Methanex charged that the California ban was
"tantamount" to an expropriation without compensation in violation of
NAFTA Article 1110 and of customary international law applicable
under Article 1105.1 In a "Second Amended Statement of Claim" ("second claim"), Methanex added a challenge both to the science underlying
the California ban and to the motivation for the ban. The company
claimed that the alleged threat to the California ground water was nothing but a pretext for turning the substantial California oxygenate market
over to methanol's principal competitor, ethanol. Ethanol is almost
entirely of domestic origin. Methanol is largely from foreign sources.
Hence, Methanex claimed the California ban on MTBE was a blatant act
of discrimination on the basis of nationality and as such violated the
"national treatment" requirement in Article 1102(1). In its second claim,
Methanex also charged that the discrimination against methanol violated
international law under Article 1105(1) and represented an uncompensated expropriation in violation of Article 1110(1).
In the end, the Tribunal issued two awards. The first, dated August
7, 2002, was a Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility. There
the Tribunal dismissed both of Methanex's first claims under Articles
1105(1) and 1110(1) but judged all three of its claims under the "Second
Amended Statement" provisionally within the cognizance-the jurisdiction-of Chapter 11. Nevertheless it ordered Methanex to produce new
pleadings and a revised evidentiary submission. In the second and Final
Award of May 23, 2005, the Tribunal, after hearing Methanex's revised
proffer of proof and final argument, dismissed on their merits all three of
Methanex's amended claims and concluded that none of those claims
were within the cognizance of Chapter 11.
While the decision for the United States was, we concede, defensible, one must nevertheless hope that the Tribunal's literal, noncontextual
formalist analytic method will not come to haunt future tribunals. Constrained by that method, the Tribunal, we contend, got the jurisdictional
issue wrong with a decision, which, if followed, could seriously limit, if
The objective of the EEC Treaty . . . is more than an agreement which merely
creates mutual obligations between the contracting states . . . [The] Community
constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states
have limited their sovereign rights .. and the subject of which comprise not only
Member States but also their nationals. Independently of the legislation of Member
States, Community law therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is
also intended to confer upon them the rights which become part of their legal
heritage.
Case C-26/62, N.V. Algemene Transp. en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v.
Netherlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 3. No such claim can be made for
NAFTA or, in fact, for any other multinational grouping within the international economy.
10. Methanex, 44 I.L.M. at 1345-46.
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not emasculate, the scope of investor rights under Chapter 11. The Tribunal then erred in denying Methanex's claim charging the United
States with violating the "national treatment" requirement of Article
1102(1). Captured by its narrow nonpurposive methodology, the Tribunal also passed up an important opportunity to reconcile environmental
values with NAFTA's liberalizing objectives; arguably the central issue
in the case." Ironically, on this issue and this issue alone, the Final
Award seems to offer sufficient factual material to sustain a decision for
the United States. But there is scarce a word in the Award suggesting
how or why NAFTA might make it so.
Furthermore, in our mind, the Tribunal correctly dismissed
Methanex's claim that the California ban by reason of its discriminatory
impact violated customary international law under Article 1105, but it
did so for all the wrong reasons. Lastly, challenged to identify investor's
rights under the expropriation provisions of NAFTA (Article 1110), the
Tribunal reverts to a simplistic analysis that is likely to elicit from investors behavior precisely contrary to what the draftsmen sought to elicit in
conferring on investors the rights enumerated in that Article.
For the Tribunal, Methanex was doubtless a difficult case. The case
had evoked a highly charged political opposition, especially in California and among environmentalists.' 2 Many, including lawyers for the
United States, said that it was an unintended use of Chapter 11.13 This
climate may very well have created personal difficulties for members of
the Tribunal. It may also have prompted a concern not to exacerbate the
rather vocal opposition to Chapter 11 so as to further undermine what
was already a rather politically fragile grant, a grant already under heavy
attack from its anticorporatist critics.' 4 But it is not for us to speculate.
11. This is a case where the environmentally driven measure-a total ban on certain
products-has had a dramatic effect on international trade. As such it is not, however, an example
of what has popularly come to be called a "linkage" of trade either strategically or institutionally
linked to environmental policies and actions that are quite separate from the trade policies and
measures to which they are linked. See Joel P. Trachtman, Institutional Linkage: Transcending
"Trade and...," 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 77 (2002).
12. See Chris Mooney, Localizing Globalization,AM. SPECTATOR, July 16, 2001, http://www.
prospect.org/cs/articles?article=localizing-globalization;
Sweet Liberty, New Nafta Lawsuit
Against the U.S., http://www.sweetliberty.org/issues/nafta-gatt/lawsuit.htm (last visited Sept. 10,
2009).
13. Specifically what is meant by this accusation is never explained very well. As a result,
one suspects that the expectations that the Methanex Case allegedly offended go back to a general
sense shared by Congress and many in the executive that Chapter I I's sole purpose was to protect
American and Canadian investors from irresponsible and potentially destructive regulation by
Mexico. It never really entered the congressional or executive mind that Methanex, a Canadian
Company, would turn this around and dare to challenge a regulation taken by the State of
California with great procedural care, especially a regulation designed to protect the environment.
14. These groups tended to see every arbitral decision that ruled in favor of an investor as
evidence that the grant of "direct effect" has become a measure driven by open hostility to
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We are dealing with the work of a distinguished, highly competent panel
whose sense of fairness and impartiality cannot be questioned. And in
the end we don't need to speculate, for we have what we need, the actual
words of the Tribunal in its Final Award. From those words, we can
readily and unquestionably trace the Tribunal's default on both the jurisdictional and the substantive issues to its noncontextual formalist

method of treaty interpretation.
We shall return time and again with proof of this last point. But

first, it is important to recognize that in the Methanex case much more
was at work than the fate of one Canadian firm injured by California's
regulatory action. There was a certain juxtaposition. On one hand, there
was NAFTA. Substantively based on measured neoliberal economic
postulates, NAFTA is replete with integrative initiatives that challenge
the very foundations of national economic sovereignty. It also brings a
new, well defined measure of democratization to the regulation of the

economic forces within its sphere. Despite its critics and its own selfimposed limitations, i" NAFTA is a remarkably successful enterprise
national health and safety measures, to labor rights, and to environmental regulations. On any of
these grounds, it is argued, the grant per se poses an unacceptable danger to the public interest.
15. See KENNETH F. SCHEVE & MATTHEW J. SLAUGHTER, GLOBALIZATION AND THE
PERCEPTION OF AMERICAN WORKERs

2, 30-32 (2001). NAFTA was only designed to generate

wealth for the United States, not to govern or even influence the internal distribution of that
increase. Yet, among the major challenges facing the United States is the need to reverse the
wholly unacceptable and ultimately dangerous division that in recent decades has been growing
between, on one hand, a small set of super-rich Americans combined with a somewhat larger
upper middle class, for whom the American economy appears to assure a quite safe and
comfortable living, and, on the other hand, a vast number of citizens who face an economic future
that is indeed bleak. Lower middle class citizens who are part of a traditionally skilled blue-collar
working class, together with a tragically growing number of citizens in or near poverty, make up
this second group of citizens. Unfortunately, and quite erroneously, this growing schism has been
blamed by some on the free trade agreements that America has made in recent decades such as the
WTO agreements, NAFTA, Asean, and other similar bilateral and multilateral agreements. See id.
at 90. While these trade agreements may have added to the complexity of the problem, they are
not responsible for the lack of domestic measures that were otherwise necessary to guard against
the growing disparity. Instead, they are part of the solution, not part of the problem. Id. at 10-11.
It is clear that these agreements, including NAFTA, have added measurably to the aggregate
wealth of the United States. If the people of the United States are ever to mount a serious assault
on the growing disparity in the sharing of their wealth, increase in that wealth is vital. Inequality
of wealth cannot be overcome unless there is added wealth to be distributed. Without a
willingness to redistribute wealth, the effective reversal of the growing disparity between our
citizens will quite simply be impossible. In this context, the arguable freeing of trade and capital
movements through such measures as NAFTA is among the most critical tasks that the United
States must undertake if it ever hopes to truly return the "American dream" to the reality it once
was. Thus, one can appreciate the extraordinary importance to every person in the United States of
the increase in wealth that the Peterson Institute for International Economics and others have
estimated has resulted from the liberalization of trade and investments that the international
community has achieved over the last several decades. As described by Scheve and Slaughter:
[T]rade and investment liberalization over the past decades has added between $500
billion and $1 trillion in annual income-between $1,650 and $3,300 a year for
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when measured by the purposes for which it was intended. In all of this,
it stands as harbinger of a new order for the governance of the global
economy.
There is, however, a contrary tapestry composed of three elements
all tied together by a strong, indeed rich, historical affinity. There is first
a method of treaty interpretation, what we speak of as "noncontextual
formalism." Second, there is a contemporary concept of national sovereignty with its roots in the Westphalian settlements. Third, lies the "realist" school of international politics. Constrained by its interpretive
method, the Tribunal's rejection of Methanex's substantive claims, its
unfortunate jurisdictional ruling, and its failure to move creatively on the
environmental and expropriation issues, served only to reify this historical triad. Indeed, if any broader lesson is to be learned from Methanex, it
is how insistently the noncontextual formalist legal method employed by
the Tribunal can, and often does, function as a first line of defense on
behalf of traditional concepts of national sovereignty and realist international politics, and against the integrative and liberalizing reforms of
16
NAFTA and treaties like it.
More specifically, what we choose to call "noncontextual formalism" is essentially an aspect of traditional positivist jurisprudence. We
chose the somewhat more elaborate designation only to highlight how
our critique of the Methanex Award roots that decision in one particular
aspect of positivism: namely, the view of law "properly so-called," as a
social construct derived from a starting point that places it at a remove
from both morality and the values, objectives, and behavioral assumptions from which social policy is constructed.
Seen from this perspective the Tribunal's work in Methanex v.
United States was noncontextual formalism writ large. There is scarcely
a word concerning the policy objectives of the relevant investor rights
under NAFTA. Nor is there any evidence that those policies or the values that inspired them ever entered into the Tribunal's deliberations. The
latter reflect a conviction that law-as least in "pure" form-is an
entirely self-contained social construct to which the larger social order is
entirely exogenous. When a text is engaged, it insists upon subjecting
that text to what it considers its own utterly autonomous formalistic
interpretive discipline, its own "noncontextual formalism." It is "formalistic" in the sense that it treats the text, in virtually its entirety, as a self
every American. A Doha agreement on global free trade in goods and services
would generate, according to similar studies, $500 billion a year in additional
income in the United States.
Kenneth F. Scheve & Matthew J. Slaughter, A New Deal for Globalization, FOREIGN ArN.,
July-Aug. 2007, at 34, 36.
16. Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, July 4, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1033, 1036-37.
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sufficient structure. It is "noncontextual" in that the words of the text,
taken in what is thought to be their "ordinary meaning," are, at critical
points, exegetically placed at a remove from the economic, political, and
social realities that animated those words in the first place and out of
which the objectives of the text were crafted. In this self-sufficient and
autonomous posture, the system is, at times, passed off under the disastrously misleading notion of law as a science. This also means that the
text is at times manipulated by a purportedly well-honed system of
established canons. These are applicable not only to the immediate ordinance under scrutiny, but to all other ordinances without notable respect
for their variable subject matter.
As the second member of the triumvirate there lies "realism." Realism offers a perspective on the political relationship between States and
is an uneasy, yet historically frequent, companion of noncontextual formalist legal theory. Political "realism" starts with a strong tendency to
see the relationship between States as rational and functionally uniform
throughout the international system. It assumes that national preferences
all range from survival to various modes of self-aggrandizement, and are
exogenous and fixed. Added to this, it views the international system
basically as anarchic, fraught with uncertainty requiring States to be
constantly alert to the possibility of internecine conflict. To a "realist,"
in short, the international system is a collection of "billiard balls: hard,
opaque, unitary actors colliding with each other."' 7
In accord with this metaphor, power is necessarily the currency of
the international system. If, within this anarchic structure, nation-states
are to enjoy even a modicum of peace and good order no one State can
be allowed to become the dominant-imperial-power. The result is the
so-called "balance-of-power," a system that does not seek "to avoid crises or even wars;" it does not seek "peace . . . [only] stability and
moderation." ' 8
Historically, despite the political "realists" tendency to disparage
all international law, 19 the affinity between the "realist" vision of international politics and the noncontextual formalist theory of international
law was both doctrinally and operationally palpable. To the lawyers, at
least, the relationship between noncontextual formalist legal theory and
"realist" political theory was captured largely through the notion of a
"balance-of-power." It stood as the only ordering principle-the only
17. Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L.
503, 507 (1995).
18. HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 20-21 (1995).
19. GEORGE F. KENNAN, AROUND THE CRAGGED HILL: A PERSONAL AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 64 (1993); HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS
12 (Kenneth W.
Thompson ed., McGraw-Hill 1993) (1948).
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generative force for law-that the inherently anarchic system of the
international political "realists" was capable of sustaining. As Kingsbury
points out, early Twentieth Century international noncontextual formalists such as Lassa Oppenheim thought of "the balance of power [a]s 'a
political principle indispensable to the existence of International Law' ";
a "determina[nt] of law." 2 °
In no small part, this convergence reflected a belief, inherited from
the Enlightenment, that the balance-of-power would tend toward the
"common good. 2 1 Yet, that faith proved "elusive in the century of
almost constant conflict that followed the Thirty Years War" 2 2 but even
more so in the horrors that marked twentieth-century wars. Too often the
vaunted "balance" served only to cloak incursions by the powerful or to
rationalize a war of all against all. In consequence, many of Oppenheimer's successors, such as Lauterpacht and Brierly, appeared to retreat
from the paradigm. Yet, just under the surface of the intersection where
international politics in its "realist" form meets international law in its
noncontextual formalist mode, lies both the anarchic conception of the
international system and the balance-of-power as the principal ordering
limitation upon that anarchy.
This affinity-this apparent intellectual convergence of the noncontextual formalist vision of international law with the "realist" conception of international politics-can be more fully demonstrated by
examining the affinity between the noncontextual formalist view of law
and the attributes of "national sovereignty" as developed following the
Westphalian settlements. This we explore more fully in Part II below.
For the present, the point to emphasize is the importance of recognizing
how the Tribunal's noncontextual formalist legal analysis in Methanex
succeeded in working a virtually complete disconnect between, on one
hand, the NAFTA text and, on the other hand, its reformative economic
and political premises-its powerful integrative initiatives, and its pervasive democratic influences. By this disconnect, the Tribunal served
only to defend traditional notions of national sovereignty and the realist
conception of the international political order against NAFTA as the har20. Benedict Kingsbury, Legal Positivism as Normative Politics: International Society,
Balance of Power and Lassa Oppenheim's Positive International Law, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 401,
417 (2002).
21. Kissenger's characterization of the balance-of-power continues in the following terms:
Intellectually, the concept of the balance of power reflected the convictions of all
the major political thinkers of the Enlightenment. In their view, the universe,
including the political sphere, operated according to rational principles which
balanced each other. Seemingly random acts of by reasonable men would, in their
totality, tend toward the common good.
KiSSINGER, supra note 18, at 21.
22. Id.
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binger of a new, more efficient, more inclusive, and hopefully more just
global economic order.
Lastly, against the background of these three long-held theoretical
attributes of the international community-"noncontextual formalist"
legal theory, Westphalian based national sovereignty and "realist" political theory-we come to NAFTA Chapter 11 and its grant of "direct
effect" to investor rights. That grant, if exercised free of noncontextual
formalist constraints, offers a major challenge to the political "realists"
paradigm. It begins to disaggregate that paradigm, to break open the
"billiard ball." It explicitly draws into the confluence of a nation's foreign-policy deliberations, one part-albeit a small part-but nevertheless a part of the richly textured and ever-broadening web of a nation's
cross-boundary relationships; relationships engaging private individuals,
business establishments, labor representatives, national, state and local
bureaucrats, NGO's, and other organizational alliances. But for the grant
of "direct effect," participants in those relationships would have no
voice in a member-state's foreign-policy deliberations except as they
might penetrate a political filter and influence the nation's foreign affairs
establishment-executive or legislative. Under the grant of "direct
effect," on the other hand, the formulation and execution of a Member's
foreign policy can begin to engage directly the highly diverse, intensely
active, and broadly representative elements of a nation's domestic polity. When that engagement then occurs in the context of an agreement
such as NAFTA, with its deeply integrative and reformative mandates,
conventional notions of national sovereignty and of international relationships are drawn sharply into question.
II.

"REALIST"

POLITICS, WESTPHALIAN SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE

NONCONTEXTUAL FORMALIST LEGAL METHOD

Although not an easy concept, we can appropriately say that, in
general, "sovereignty," reflective of its Westphalian roots, has today
come to mean that the formal apparatus of the nation-state must (i)
effectively exercise supreme political authority within a territory, (ii)
possess a monopoly of the legitimate use of force within that territory,
(iii) control its territorial boundary with reasonable consistency, (iv)
conduct its internal affairs free from undue external intervention, (v)
pursue a relatively independent foreign policy, and (vi) be recognized by
other States as a member of the community of sovereign nation-states.2 3
Note first how far these postulates are given over to the task of
vindicating the power and preemptive authority of the official nation23. Rafael Leal-Arcas, Theories of Supranationalism in the EU, 8 J.L. Soc'y 88, 95 n.15

(2007).
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state apparatus. Apart from bounding that power with the concept of
territoriality, there is nothing that speaks to other subtler and equally
vital attributes of nationhood: to history, cultural origins and traditions,
language, forms of governance, communal allegiances, or to any other
attribute upon which the official State apparatus might depend for legitimacy other than success in wielding coercive force. In this respect these
postulates-these attributes of "sovereignty"-fit readily into the larger
"realist" conception of the nation-State, the "billiard ball" of the international order.2 4
At the same time, viewed from a "legal," rather than "political"
perspective, these postulates constitute without doubt a legal ordering.
These are the operative elements of a customary law. As such, they
evince a strong affinity with the principal attributes of noncontextual
formalist jurisprudence. This is not to suggest that the basic tenets of
Westphalian sovereignty are product of formalist legal theory. 25 The
contention is more nuanced. We claim only that certain of the Westphalian postulates reflect ideas concerning the internal order of nation-states
and the dynamics of inter-nation-state relationships that, as statements of
principle, can be reconciled with a noncontextual formalist theory of law
more readily than with any other system of legal theory. In addition,
apart from their roots in "realist" political theory, the Westphalian postulates owe much of their creditability to noncontextual formalist legal
theory.26 The latter has worked powerfully to reify those postulates.
From this perspective, consider first the Westphalian affirmation
that to be "sovereign" the official nation-state apparatus must be the
supreme political authority within a nation's territory. This means being
the supreme law giver within that territory. It signals a preemptive
power. No values, principles, purposes, or social expectations from the
larger economic, political, and cultural setting within which the institutions or individuals charged with applying the law operate can pass as
24. Given its historical roots, this is all quite understandable. In signaling acceptance of a
religiously diverse, multistate system in lieu of a broadly shared theological and cultural
imperium, in responding to the devastation brought on by princely interventions, in articulating a
theory of at least nominal equality designed to contain princely ambition through the balance of
power, the Westphalian settlements were necessarily preoccupied with reifying the prerogatives of
the State.
25. Quite the contrary. According to the political "realist" account of Westphalian
sovereignty, cooperation between sovereigns is a transient matter and, as such, an elusive and
unstable state of affairs-a state of affairs that necessarily marginalizes any influence that
international law might have, reducing it largely to so many pious maxims contrived only to
rationalize what can be achieved through power and power alone.
26. In establishing this linkage, the only manifestations of "noncontextual formalist"
jurisprudence that concerns us here relate to the interpretive methodology used by courts,
arbitrators, executive officers, and others charged with applying or otherwise interpreting the
mandates of a legal text or of other authoritative sources.
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law, or even help shape law, unless officially embraced by the authoritative organs of the nation-state.
This leads inexorably to the dominant propensity of noncontextual
formalism. When asked to settle concrete issues of governance according to law, the only result that noncontextual formalism accepts as legitimate is a result explicitly or clearly implicit within what is thought to be
the ordinary meaning of a norm-a rule or principle-laid down or
adopted by the nation-state.27 This holds true whether the norm is
embodied in a constitution, in legislation, or in a judicial opinion or
executive order issued in the exercise of constitutional or legislative
authority.2 8 And it is this basic tenet that, with varying degrees of intensity, manifests itself in the noncontextual formalist's reluctance to
embrace results drawn from the purposes and informing values-the
history, the psychological, political, economic, and cultural assumptions-that gave birth to or reflect the contemporary society mirrored in
the official text, rather than from the "ordinary meaning" of the text
itself. It reflects a tendency to deny that autonomous sources such as
"natural law" or "community-wide values" or the "customs" of the community or the practices and expectations of functional groups within the
community (e.g., merchants) could ever give definitive meaning to the
text.29 Above all else, noncontextual formalist dogma abhors any interpretive move that would go outside the word, outside the text-the official expression or its implications-even when necessary to keep faith
with the core values embraced by the text.
This general methodological disposition applies not only to municipal law but also to international law whether it be a treaty-"conventional" international law-or a norm of customary law that qualifies as
such under a strict application of opiniojuris. The latter doctrine, strictly
construed,3" does in fact represent another point of affinity between legal
noncontextual formalism and the political realist's paradigm. To the
strict legal noncontextual formalist, no normative limit on the use of
sovereign power-no law-could exist unless the sole legitimate purveyors of power had consented to the limit. Therefore, customary inter27. Jonathon T. Molot, Ambivalence About Formalism, 93 VA. L. REv. 1, 46 (2007).
28. There is, of course, a formative process that must follow certain rules, what Henry Hart
called the "rule of recognition": rules through which the lawmaker takes into account the stuff that
goes into law. But that is not "law properly so-called" or the law of everyday that the courts, the
executive, and the legal profession apply in execution of an official text.
29. Ely, writing about U.S. constitutional interpretation has very insightfully discussed this
"noncontextual formalist" tendency under the label of "interpretivism." Although, as we hope to
demonstrate, the Methanex Tribunal's version of "interpretivism" is far narrower and slavishly
tied to a literal interpretation of the text than Ely's discourse would appear to allow. JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRuST 1 (1980).
30. Consider an entirely revised notion of opinio juris, discussed infra.
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national law, if it exists at all, must necessarily find its origin in
sovereign consent. It could not be reflective of an overarching system of
shared value expectations held broadly by the international community
but to which no explicit consent could be traced (e.g., justice, fairness
and equity, good faith, and transparency).

Take this one step further: consider the Westphalian prohibition
against external intervention in the domestic affairs of a "sovereign"
nation-state. Read this prohibition in light of the noncontextual formalist's insistence that only the explicit or clearly implicit postulates
authored or endorsed by the formal apparatus of the nation-state can
qualify as law, "properly so-called." The latter necessarily suggests that

no moral or social value, as are found today, for example, in much
"human rights" law, can be thought to justify an exception to the Westphalian prohibition on foreign intervention, unless that value can command the target nation-state's consent. In other words, no humanitarian
or moral precept even if expressed or accepted through the agency of an
opino juris can pass as international law unless backed by the target

State's approval. More particularly, this rejection of any value-laden
exception to the Westphalian prohibition on foreign intervention is reinforced by noncontextual formalism's traditional separation between law
and morality. 3
31. Morality to most noncontextual formalists is very broad. It consists of sensitivity to right
from wrong, to the stirrings of conscience, and common conceptions of decency and fair play. It
consists also of cultural preconceptions and of the ways we identify the purpose or object of a
human undertaking. More generously, it would appear to encompass every conceivable standard
for judging human conduct that is not law. Noncontextual formalism's most distinguished
contemporary exponent, H.L.A. Hart, has characterized the law-morality dichotomy as nothing
less than a distinction between "law as it is" and "law as it ought to be." To appreciate how the
noncontextual formalists employ this dichotomy one needs to consider their theory of sources.
From whence does law emanate? There is Austin's now largely discredited theory of "sovereign
command," Kelsen's "primary norm," and Hart's "rule of recognition." Within the deliberative
processes implied by these sources, morality, broadly conceived, can play a decisive role. The
guiding question is what "ought" to be the law. Under the aegis of that inquiry morality, the
stirrings of conscience, right from wrong, purpose and social objective may be decisive. Yet, the
workings of these sources are not law in the strict noncontextual formalist sense. They are not an
authoritative pronouncement for the governance of society (except perhaps for the governance of
those engaged in making law). They are instead a statement of how a rule or other pronouncement
required to be taken by society as authoritative ("law, properly so-called") is to be conceived. On
the other hand, once the sources of law have spoken, once the authoritative pronouncement has
issued, then the dichotomy between law and morality-between the "law as it is" and the "law as
it ought to be"-becomes fundamental to all that follows by way of application and enforcement
of the authoritative pronouncement-to the process of bringing that pronouncement to life. For
the judges, executive officials, administrators, all those charged with making the law a living
presence in society, the first obligation is to "the law as it is." It is not for them to pick and choose
according to what they believe the "law ought to be." Their obligation of fidelity to law is fidelity
to the rule as it is given to them. In no small measure, the roots of this obligation lie in a desire to
assure that "law and its authority" not be "dissolved" into one man's conceptions of what law and
its authority "ought to be." For our purposes, however, the dichotomy is more far reaching. The
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This is not to suggest that even as the Westphalian system was
emerging during the seventeenth and eighteenth century, alternative
legal theories were unavailable to ameliorate the harsh lessons of classic
political "realism." In time, however, none of the alternative theories
could break through the intellectual presuppositions that "realist" politics and ultimately legal positivism seemed to compel. Leo Gross, in an
elegant essay, comments:
From the 18th century... there can be no doubt as to the trend of the
development. It was predominantely positivist and consensual. The
will of the states seems to explain both the contents and the binding
force of international law. The concept of the Family of Nations
recedes in the background . . . Instead of heralding the era of a
genuine international community of nations subordinated to the rule
of the law of nations, [the Peace of Westphalia] led to the era of
absolutist states, jealous of their territorial sovereignty to a point
where the idea of an international community became an almost
empty phrase and where international law came to depend upon the
will of states more concerned with the preservation and expansion of
their power than with the establishment of a rule of law.3"
One can readily understand the difficulties of formulating a foundation for the orderly and predictable conduct of human affairs in a world
of powerful, ambitious, and oft-times ruthlessly warring nation-states.
Some, the "neorealists" for example, say it is theoretically impossible.3 3
Certainly, no system is credible if it refuses to acknowledge that a
nation's raw military, economic, and political power can be at work in
influencing the quality and shaping the direction of its relations with
other nation-states. One can also understand how, under these constraints, the possibilities for international law may be thought to exist
only in the case of those normative postulates to which nation-states
have, in a strict sense, given their consent. No less understandable is
reader will appreciate that behind the dichotomy between "law as it is" and "law as it ought to be"
lies a certain distinctive conception of language. To the noncontextual formalist there is within

most, if not all, coherent authoritative pronouncements a "core" of meaning-a statement of what
"the law is"-that can, through a determined nonpurposive inquiry using deductive or analogical
reasoning be applied to new situations relatively free of doubt and without seriously engaging any
question of morality-of what the "law ought to be." Where this is not the case, where a new
situation arises to which the application of the rule remains indeterminate, and where, despite a
rigorous use of deductive or analogical reasoning, the rule must be interpreted-where the case
falls within the "penumbra" of the rule-then, and only then, to some but not all noncontextual
formalists is the question of what the "law ought to be" relevant. In this narrow setting the
interpretive task, to the noncontextual formalist, becomes unequivocally law making-an exercise
of the legislative power.
32. Leo Gross, Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 Am. J. Ir'L L. 20, 37-38 (1948).
33. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY
(1999); Richard Rorty, Dewey and Posner and Moral Progress, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 915, 921
(2007).
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why that consent must be confined to the "ordinary meaning" of the
words of a text read in accord with some overarching and consistent
interpretive methodology that will guard against the temporizing influences of the various political, economic, and cultural circumstances that
occasioned the need for consent or from the political and economic idiosyncrasies of the individuals called to judge that consent. Only literal
applications, it may be thought, offer that degree of predictability necessary if jealous States are to be induced by treaties and other modes of
international cooperation to relinquish the possibilities for unilateral
action.
But in the end this view is deceptive. There is another side to it.
The search for predictability in any legal system can quickly start one
down a very short road to a loss of legitimacy if it results in a lack of
attention to the fundamental economic and political purposes and social
values used to justify the system. It is also true, especially in the international economic sphere (but elsewhere as well), that international law, its
precepts, methods, and institutions, are reaching out to bring more and
more of the world's transnational relationships under normative constraint. Whatever else "globalization" may entail, among its principal
causes is the extraordinary expansion of international law in recent
decades.34 In consequence of this, but without pretending to offer a comprehensive answer to either noncontextual formalist interpretive theory
or to the "neorealist" theoreticians, this essay offers just one case, the
Methanex case under NAFTA; a case the errors of which show rather
dramatically how the grant of "direct effect" can, when properly used,
undermine noncontextual formalist interpretive theory, disaggregate the
political realist's paradigm, challenge conventional notions of sovereignty, and, in each of these ways, contribute to the developmental and
reformative objectives of NAFTA and other ventures in international
cooperation. By this case study one may hopefully begin to appreciate
the threat to cooperative international ventures posed by the literal
nonpurposive (noncontextual formalist) methodology that so decisively
shaped the Methanex decision.

34. Perhaps the most dramatic expansion occurred when the GATT was superseded by the
WTO. In addition there has been a virtual explosion in free trade agreements and investment
agreements between developed countries such as the Treaty of Rome, the EFIA, The CanadianUnited States Free Trade Agreement, and a growing number of such charters between developing
countries, including the numerous agreements between Latin American and Caribbean countries
and between African countries and by developing countries with industrialized nation-states,
including the ASEAN agreement, the Bilateral Investment Treaties and the various iterations of
the Lome Convention.
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II.

"DIRECT EFFECT":

A

MODEST REFORM

Traditionally, with few exceptions, only sovereign nation-states had
standing to adjudicate questions of international law in international
tribunals. That remains true today although with increasing exceptions.3 5
This situation has persisted even when the dispute at issue concerns
agreements intended to protect private interests. In general, private parties have to await governmental action-usually by their own government-for vindication of their rights. Plainly, Chapter 11 challenges this
tradition.
It is, of course, true that only nation-states, by treaty or other agreement, can confer on private parties the right to compel a nation-state to
answer in an international forum for alleged violations of the agreement.36 When, however, a dispute does arise the grant of "direct effect"
35. This applies to the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), see Barcelona Traction, Light &
Power Co. (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5), as it did to its predecessor, the Permanent Court
of International Justice ("PICJ"). It also applies to the dispute resolution panels and the Appellate
Body of the WTO. It also applies to the Law of the Sea Tribunal, among the most prominent
permanent international tribunals. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 98. Not until the truly innovative decisions of the ECJ giving "direct
effect" to provisions of the Rome Treaty was there any post-World War II international tribunal
with permanent standing in which private parties could adjudicate claims against governments for
the violation of their rights under international law. The decisions of the ECJ, however, arose, as
we have already seen, out of a unique political context that differs in marked respects from that in
which the international economic system seen from a global perspective now operates. Nothing
nearly as structurally far-reaching can be said about any other international grouping, regional or
otherwise, including NAFTA. The first step in the same general direction after the ECJ decisions
was the movement toward the negotiation of Bilateral Investment Treaties ("BITS"). Under the
earliest versions of the BITS, claims by a private investor from one Nation-state Party that the
other nation-state Party had violated the investor's rights under the treaty were subject to
private-nation-state arbitration. Later versions of these treaties often provided for arbitration
under ICSID rules. By the end of 1965, however, only fourteen such treaties by Germany, ten by
Switzerland, and one each by France, Italy, and the Netherlands with developing countries had
come into force. Much later, in the 1980's and 90's the BITS movement gained substantial
momentum although, until very recently, the number of cases brought by investors under those
agreements has been quite limited. See UNITED NATIONS CTR. ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPS.,
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 129, 154 (1988) (list of BITS concluded prior to 1987). In
1966, the Convention establishing the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
("ICSID") came into force. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States, § 1, art. 1, convention approved Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T.
1270 [hereinafter Investment Disputes Between States]. Later in 1978 came the Additional
Facilities Rule. Currently, nation-states are signatories to the ICSID Convention. In 1980, the IranUnited States Claims Tribunal was established. While standing in the long tradition of ad hoc
tribunals for the adjudication of international claims, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
nevertheless represents a systematic and significant effort to use private-nation-state adjudication
through arbitration in dealing with the massive economic dislocations occasioned by the Iranian
Revolution. See City of the Hague, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, June 2008, http://
www.denhaag.comldefault.aspid=476.
36. It should be understood that we use the word "treaty" in a generic sense to include all
comparable agreements, covenants, conventions, etc.
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formally removes one nation-state from the dispute altogether, reducing
or eliminating its power to shape the outcome. Even if the State retains
some capacity to influence the outcome, formally the private party alone
decides whether to invoke the international adjudicative process established by the treaty. The private party controls which of the treaty rights
are to be asserted in that process, the legal theories employed in support
of those rights, and the arguments used to sustain the theories chosen.
The private party is responsible for the way the claim is pleaded-for all
strategic and tactical decisions. In agreement with the respondent nationstate, the private party has the final say on whether to settle the dispute
and to make that decision irrespective of what its own nation-state may
consider politically expedient.37 The grant of "direct effect," in other
words, draws private interests-both individual and institutional-into
the multinational social order created by a treaty in a far more direct
fashion than would otherwise occur under a traditional government-centered negotiating or adjudicative paradigm.
Moreover, as we shall see, that grant has powerful implications
albeit with a limited scope. Not surprisingly, therefore, a contentious and
quite-sophisticated debate has arisen over whether and under what conditions, if any, "direct effect" should be adopted as a mode of dispute
settlement in trade and other like agreements-a mode to accompany the
more familiar forms of diplomatic negotiation and government-to-government adjudication.
It is not, however, our intention here to enter that debate in any
systematic way. We deal only with "investors"' rights and do not
address any broader scope that the grant may have by reason of Article
1105.38 Nor do we judge what effect the grant may have, if any, on
Chapter 11 as a deterrent against breach of its mandates or as an inducement to comply with those constraints. We do not consider any possible
interplay between the grant and governmental efforts to either adjudicate
or negotiate the settlement of a claim. These are all questions for another
day. Here we take only the first vital step in that discussion. Against a
general background of the systemic challenges that "direct effect" can
bring to "realist" politics and traditional notions of sovereignty, and the
37. The points made here are probably equally applicable to adjudication based solely on
customary international law. But a grant of "direct effect" to the substance of that law would
doubtlessly require some form of treaty or other agreement between States. Nevertheless, in
shaping the substantive content of that law, the tribunal to whom the adjudication is assigned may
generally be thought to play a broader role than it might in shaping the substantive content of a
treaty or other international agreement. NAFTA takes this step in Article 1105. It assimilates into
the treaty regime at least some postulates of customary international law.
38. We deal only with the explicitly identified offenses listed in Chapter 11 and respect the
limitation that the ITC has imposed on Article 1105 as a reference solely to violations of
"customary international law."
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values inherent in those challenges, our interest is confined to evaluating
the interpretive methodology used by the Methanex Tribunal in executing its mandate; nothing more than that.
Consistent with this limited purpose, we nevertheless must address
one major argument against giving "direct effect" to investor rights
under economic agreements. It is an argument for confining dispute settlement under those agreements exclusively to diplomacy or to government-to-government adjudication. It is also an argument for diplomatic
flexibility and is critical to our present purposes because it engages the
methodological issues central to this essay.
The argument for diplomatic flexibility builds on the fact that cases
can certainly arise where a private investor's suit against a foreign government for violation of the investor's treaty rights could seriously
embarrass the foreign relations or other, larger national interests of the
investor's own country. Whether this is likely to occur in any case is
usually a matter for the executive to judge. Having said that, however, it
does not mean that the executive's preference necessarily serves the
nation's public or national interest. One cannot assume that the executive necessarily speaks for the public interest when, in the exercise of
discretion, it either refuses to pursue or it bars others from pursuing a
negotiated or litigated solution to a controversy; a point to emerge dramatically from Methanex.
Time and again in Methanex, the United States, represented by the
State Department's Legal Advisor's Office, favored arguments over a
wide range of issues whose chief and sometimes only virtue lay in
advancing the State Department's interest in winning the case for the
United States as the respondent. These arguments served only a narrowly bureaucratic "state interest" not unlike that of a lawyer defending
a private client at all costs. Lost, time and again, from the Legal Advisor's argument was the "public interest" of the United States in the economic and political goals that the framers of NAFTA had in mind in
granting investors' protection or in attempting to strengthen governance
of the international economy. Repeatedly, the Legal Advisor's Office
appeared to have opted for a narrow bureaucratic "state interest" far
removed from the "public interest" mirrored in the economic, political,
and social context that captured the public consensus leading to the
adoption of NAFTA.3 9
39. Perhaps this posture is endemic to any executive when called upon to respond to charges
that its government has violated a treaty or other agreement. That possibility, however, is well
beyond the reach of this essay for, if true, it might be thought to cast new light on the use of an
independent international tribunal to settle all disputes of this nature. That issue, of course, would
take us far-a-field of our present agenda.
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There is, of course, no intention here to suggest that executives cannot or do not, at times, speak out of a genuine "public" concern to avoid
the adverse consequences that a law suit against a foreign government
may have for a nation's foreign policy. Nor do we deny that a private
suit can, on occasion, gravely complicate the executive's ability to pursue that policy effectively.4 ° It does remind us, however, that perhaps
endemic to the government lawyers' situation is a conflict between the
lawyers' personal bureaucratic interests and the larger "public interests"
with which they are charged. Until some form of institutional or principled mediation is devised, there is no reason to believe that an executive
with complete discretion can be any more reliable as a purveyor of the
public interest than was the State Department in its Methanex
performance. 4 '
The implication is suggestive. On one hand, grants of "direct
effect" can adversely affect the foreign policies of an investor's own
government. On the other hand, those grants, when properly exercised,
can very substantially benefit governance of the global economy. While
this intuitively suggests something of a highly contestable trade-off
between the two, one should, for the moment, consider the possibility of
a more nuanced choice.
Even if an investor with a claim against a treaty partner chooses to
invoke the right to sue the latter, the investor's government is not barred
from attempting to persuade the investor to either drop or delay the suit
in the interests of its nation's foreign relations. And it cannot be thought
that such appeals lack force. If the situation posited by the government is
credible, its argument persuasive, the private investor may very well find
its own interests served by heeding the government's plea. This means
that in drafting the agreement the treatymaker's choice to either grant or
deny investors a right of private suit reduces to two alternatives.
If the agreement confers no right on an investor to sue-contains
no grant of "direct effect"-and if, in any particular case, a government
views the investor's dispute with a foreign government as disruptive of
its interests, we can, indeed must, assume that government will do nothing-by espousal or otherwise-to advance the investor's interests. This
40. We acknowledge that where the grant of "direct effect" is unrestricted, as in Methanex,
the executive will have to rely solely on its power to persuade the private interests involved to
withhold taking action. This, however, is not an inconsiderable power in the hands of a
government prepared to use that power.
41. Possibly, this posture by an executive is a natural response to the exigencies of the
intense, adversarial atmosphere that a grant of "direct effect" can engender. But query whether the
exigency is any less when the executive must rely exclusively on diplomatic negotiations in a
setting where its own legislature, the press, an entire industry, and the foreign investment
community are looking over its shoulder.
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effectively means that without "direct effect" the public's interest in
treaty compliance and the private investor's personal interests will
almost certainly be subordinated to whatever interests-"narrowly
bureaucratic," "broadly public," or otherwise-that the executive
chooses for that moment. On the other hand, if the investor's rights are
given "direct effect," then either (i) the private investor will find the
government's fear of policy disruption persuasive and the broader foreign-policy interests of the nation will prevail or (ii) the investor will
ignore the government's fears, pursue its treaty rights and the "national
interest" in treaty enforcement will prevail, whether the private investor
wins or loses its case. Paradoxically perhaps, only with the grant of
"direct effect" can the national interest be assured. It will be either the
broader foreign-policy interests of the nation or the nation's interest in
treaty enforcement, the latter a second best "national interest" perhaps,
but certainly preferable to the interests identified by an executive constrained to replicate the State Department's Methanex performance. At
the same time the lesson for us is clear; the more favorable-second
best-interest is utterly dependent on the tribunal's loyalty to the purposes of the treaty in question and to the economic, political, and social
values underlying those purposes.
This background, in turn, should make it manifestly apparent that
grants of "direct effect" properly executed can reformulate the place that
private claimants and their interests play in the ordering of global economic affairs. Among other effects, they can expose all components of
the respondent nation-state's bureaucracy to the strictures of international law in a far more immediate way than would otherwise occur.
They can induce greater bureaucratic sensitivity to international law
even among those agencies with an exclusively domestic competence
and can enhance cooperation among similarly situated regulatory agencies in the member nation-states. "Direct effect" can also supply an
added and possibly readier entrance point for NGOs and other civic
organizations into a nation's foreign-policy discourse. Although of limited scope when compared with the whole panoply of its members' foreign relations, a grant of "direct effect" to investors' rights definitively
disaggregates the traditional realist conception of the nation-state in its
international relations, the "bowling ball" of the metaphor. It moves all
investors within a nation-state potentially caught up in a transnational
dispute on a trajectory with far greater affinity to contemporary "liberal"
international political theory than to anything the political realists would
recognize.
The most salient of the "liberal" theorists' principles for our purposes lies in the recognition that a nation's foreign policy tends to be
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influenced as much by the demands of its domestic polity, however
varied and fractured those demands may be, as it is guided by the possibilities inherent in some abstraction mirroring a nation's political, economic, and military power in relation to that of other governments. 42
Contrary to the realist metaphor, the nation-state is neither "opaque" nor
a "bowling ball." The frequency and level at which nations today intrude
into each others' domestic affairs, the ever expanded web of international commitments, and the increasing scope and depth of daily contacts-both private and public-signals a level of interaction at which
all "foreign policy," at least for a democracy, is as "domestic" as it is
"foreign." Virtually any decision involving significant resources-public or private-originating in one country can visit adverse consequences on other countries severe enough to evoke from the latter a
response jeopardizing the very objectives that prompted the originating
decision in the first place. In a world wired in this intensely interactive
manner, choices can be painfully difficult, engaging the interests of the
entire society. Who domestically must bear the burden of change-the
loss of jobs or of an entire business-necessary to garner the welfare
gains that international comparative advantage makes possible? When
should potential increases in national wealth from international trade and
investment be compromised by a concern for the domestic distribution
of that wealth or by other pressing domestic priorities? When, if at all,
should domestic political stability be preferred over international
demands for internal political and social reform? Where is the line
between committing to international cooperation and reserving the freedom to act unilaterally?
In the end, answers to these questions-to foreign policy-involve
a complex dialog between potentially multiple domestic coalitions,
between individuals and groups with differing interests and differing
principles brought together in support of some discrete objective. Common interests must be clearly identified. But no less important are the
concepts, the ideas, the principles, even the rhetoric necessary to identify
and cement a sense of shared purpose. So much so that success for any
international venture, especially in the case of a comprehensive reformative treaty such as NAFTA, can depend as much on skill in managing
domestic interest-group politics as on manipulating the economic and
military power of the nation.
Treaty interpretation in this complex and uncertain milieu is profoundly ill-served by the Methanex Tribunal's jurisprudence. And the
critical message to emerge from Methanex is that the interpretive task, at
least in the case of a broadly reformative agreement such as NAFTA, is
42. Scheve & Slaughter, supra note 15, at 38.
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not bounded by its words but by the objectives it was intended to
serve-its purposes-and the underlying economic, political, and cultural values necessary to a fuller understanding of those purposes.4 3
This is so by the very nature of the case. NAFTA is a regime with a
distinctive political and economic and, to some, controversial orientation
containing a plethora of domestically intrusive norms. Nothing can more
surely undermine the creditability and consequent political support for
such a regime than if, in the course of its implementation, the coalitions-both domestic and foreign-that gave it life withdraw their support. And nothing will secure such defections more rapidly than if, when
challenged by the inevitable opposition to the treaty, tribunals charged
with settling disputes over meaning fail to fulfill its supporters' expectations, expectations defined not by the words of the treaty but by the ends
it was designed to serve. Purpose, not words, is the talisman of legitimacy for the interpretive enterprise.
On occasion, the outcomes required by a treaty text are, of course,
reasonably discernable by nothing more complex than assigning to the
words used such meaning as the interpreter can identify as "ordinary"
usage. But this is infrequent. Too often words are burdened by a disarming encounter with either reality or the inventive power of one's protagonist. Most often one can reliably find a treaty's mandate only after all
forms of conduct that its words can rationally entertain are tested against
the reading most likely to serve the treaty's larger objectives. Even then
one may have to choose between contradictory imperatives. Moreover, a
usable portrait of the treaty's objectives may depend upon understanding
the underlying political, economic, and cultural assumptions at work in
that design. For in the end, the social forces whose ordering is the object
of law are, by definition, entirely endogenous to anything that may be
called law. This also means that, not infrequently, when careful attention
to words yields no discernable course of action, the treaty's purposes
must still be followed. There is no escape from purpose. No lacuna in
the text can offer an escape. A refusal to decide because the necessary

43. Irrespective of how one judges the wisdom of it, NAFTA was, in fact, built upon strong
yet measured neoliberal economic postulates. In its origins, the Agreement reflected a widely
shared belief that national economic progress could best be assured by a system in which
resources moved internationally according to the dictates of open and competitive markets
operating under the watch of carefully calibrated government regulation. In this respect, NAFTA
owed much to its antecedents in the Canadian-United States Free Trade Agreement and to the
Presidential decrees opening portions of the Mexican economy to foreign trade and investment.
Regardless of how one assesses the accomplishments of NAFTA in the years following its
inauguration, in its origins, NAFTA mirrored what was widely assumed to be the lesson of the
1980's-the utter failure of Latin America's experiment with autarkic, import-substitution
policies compared with the highly successful East Asian commitment to open markets.
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words are absent, risks affirmatively deciding what purpose would otherwise reject.
The larger import of these interpretive nuances as applied to investors' rights under Chapter 11 are best seen in relation to the "national
treatment" requirement of Article 1102(1), 4 the Article principally
relied upon by Methanex in its claim against California's MTBE ban.
For reasons discussed later, "national treatment" is a constitutive element-a systemic piece-critical to the very structure of the emerging
international economic order. It is also one of NAFTA's most intrusive
challenges to the traditional Westphalian conception of sovereignty."a Its
importance in both respects is underscored by the grant of "direct
effect." That grant represents a deliberate effort to achieve a more extensive enforcement of the "national treatment" requirement than would
otherwise occur if that requirement were left solely to diplomatic
maneuver or government-to-government adjudication. Weiler captures
the point nicely in discussing the impact that "direct effect" has had on
the enforcement of the European Union treaties. He states:
Effectively, individuals in real cases and controversies . . . became
the principal "guardians" of the legal integrity of Community law
within Europe similar to the way that individuals in the United States
have been the principal actors in ensuring the vindication of the Bill
of Rights and other federal law. 46
If NAFTA Chapter 11 parallels the European experience, if "direct
effect" signals a design to intensify enforcement of the substantive provisions of that Chapter-most especially the "national treatment"
requirement-nothing would frustrate that design more surely than for
arbitrators to crib the scope of that requirement-its jurisdictionwithin the bounds of a narrow literal reading impervious to its more
ambitious purposes, to read it as the Methanex Tribunal read it.
This propensity raises yet another point. Intensified enforcement
means more frequent claims and more frequent judgments, building, as a
consequence, a body of precedent, even if not labeled as such.4 7 Prop44. Article 1102(1) provides as follows:
Each party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favorable
than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or
other disposition of investment.
North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 7, art. 1102(1).
45. Most notably the "national treatment" requirement is potentially at least a major
roadblock to national programs to improve the competitiveness of domestic industry and service
establishments.
46. J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2414 (1991).

47. While decisions by individual Tribunals legally obligate only the parties to the arbitration
and have no formal controlling effect on subsequent tribunals, they inevitably become part of the
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erly done this should lead to an increased refinement in the law and to
rendering the law more responsive to the treaty's guiding purposes and
adding importantly to both the flexibility and the predictability of the
law. This is in sharp contrast to the limited opportunity that governmentto-government adjudication presents for a reasoned interpretation of a
treaty or other agreement by independent authority. And, certainly, interpretations propounded in the course of a contentious diplomatic negotiation are likely to be viewed as so self serving as to lack all but the most
limited creditability. In short, a grant of "direct effect" is more likely to
provide that systematic flow of reasoned explication that alone can bring
predictability and, as a consequence, acceptance to a very generally
worded text as a legitimate ordinance of government. Paradoxically, perhaps adjudication between investors and nation-states may prove as or
more effective than government-to-government litigation or diplomatic
negotiation in addressing the so-called externalities problem-the problem that a divergence will arise between a reading of the text favored by
the litigating investor and a contrary reading favored by a wider community of other similarly situated investors.
Enhanced predictability can also help guard against that undisciplined bias in which some fear tribunals will engage if left free to
follow an open and liberally purposive interpretive method. Enhanced
predictability can also garner increased political support for the treaty
from those domestic groups whose interests it serves and can play
directly into the political dynamics-the coalition building-essential to
continued political support for the integrative venture represented by the
treaty. But once again all of these benefits depend utterly upon arbitral
decisions "properly done," decisions that are seen to keep faith with the
economic, political, and societal goals that prompted support in the first
place and upon which continued support depends.
Lastly, a point of history emphasizes the importance of legal
method. Irrespective of how one judges the wisdom of it, NAFTA was,
as already noted, built upon strong yet measured neoliberal economic
postulates. 4 8 In this respect, it owed a great deal to the Presidential
decrees that, prior to NAFTA, opened much of the Mexican economy to
foreign trade and investment. Yet, embodied only in Presidential decrees
the reforms were vulnerable to later domestic political oppositionopposition sure to come. Accordingly, it was thought that casting
treaty's acqui and are often followed by later tribunals who in assaying the substantive
persuasiveness of the prior decision and their willingness to follow it are not unaffected by the fact
it has emanated from a formal adjudicative authority.
48. It reflected a widely shared belief that national economic progress could best be assured
by a system in which resources moved internationally according to the dictates of open and
competitive markets operating under the watch of carefully calibrated government regulation.
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NAFTA's liberal reforms in treaty form would provide a vital measure
of protection against that opposition. Legislative ratification of the treaty
would provide a democratic imprimatur, which the Presidential initiatives lacked while a domestic political attempt to undo NAFTA's
reforms could be countered as an embarrassment to relations with powerful treaty partners.
Patently, this stratagem rendered NAFTA vulnerable especially to
antiglobalization ideologues who would charge that NAFTA was nothing but a cynical contrivance designed to take from the people of North
America the power to govern their own economies-nothing but a
naked projection of power by special corporatist interests devoid of all
democratic legitimacy.4 9
The truth, however, is more complex. NAFTA is a special contrivance. It is driven by the rapidly emerging reality that, if regulatory
control of any nation's economy is to be genuinely democratic, that control must extend to as wide a segment as possible of the polity affected
by that economy, irrespective of citizenship or where it may live. From
this viewpoint, NAFTA does indeed change things. It subjects each
member nation-state to a system of rules legally enforceable by arbitration5 0 and designed to eliminate or at least limit a vast array of harms
that one member nation-state can visit on another. Embodied in a treaty,
the rules also have a certain moral force capable of influencing any diplomatic dialogue premised on their mandates. In this way, NAFTA, and
treaties like it, bring new meaning to the concept of democratic legitimacy. With rules consented to by representatives of the member nationstates freely chosen by the people of those nation-states,5 1 NAFTA
begins, in a very modest way, the as yet unfinished task of assuring that
in so far as possible the people who must bear the consequences of economic activity have, through a system of rules formed with their consent, a shared power of governance over that activity exercised without
regard to the member nation-state in which they happen to live. In a real
sense NAFTA is a transnational construct boldly transcending the limits
of Westphalian sovereignty to democratize the governance of economic
forces that otherwise out-run the capacity of individual nation-states to
control.
Set in this context, Chapter 1 's grant of "direct effect" to investor
rights takes on special significance. It puts the power to initiate and
49. See generally

NOAM CHOMSKY, PROFIT OVER PEOPLE (1999) (criticizing neoliberalism).
50. This is primarily government-to-government arbitration under Chapter 20 but includes

private-nation-state arbitration in the case of investor rights.
51. Citizens of complex democracies like the United States, Canada, and Mexico should
certainly understand "representative democracy" and respect its extension to the international
sphere.
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materially control enforcement of the rules at the disposal of the very
people intended to be protected by them. It is unlike the case where
nation-state-to-nation-state settlement, through adjudication or diplomacy, is the sole mode for enforcing internationally mandated individual
rights. Under those modes, the destruction of investor rights and of the
hopes and aspirations that go with them, the pain, the loss, the degradation, and the injustice suffered, can be remedied, if at all, only if the
individual succeeds in working through some bureaucratic or political
filter-only if they succeed in persuading their own bureaucratic or
political establishment that their claim is a matter of collective concern
or they succeed in bringing political influence to bear on that same
establishment. Not so, when the individual has at his or her disposal
both the right and the remedy or has, under a grant of "direct effect,"
power to by-pass the filter.
This, in turn has further democratic implications. An independent
judiciary is an essential cornerstone of a working democracy. A "day in
court" has, for the vast majority of citizens, become the most immediate
and visible entr6e to the power required to vindicate its rights. In consequence, access to judicial assistance has become an utterly vital aspect
of the democratic ethos. Thus it is that, in the case of a treaty with a
reformative agenda and democratic credentials, "direct effect" works an
immediate devolution of those reforms to all members of the expanded
polity who can bring themselves within the treaty's mandates. It brings
to the treaty's democratic pretensions-to the expanded polity-a vitality that no diplomatic process or nation-state-to-nation-state adjudication can mobilize. Yet, once again, access to power has no meaning
unless the arbitral or judicial tribunals charged with dispensing that
power keep faith with the purposes-the social objectives-sought to be
achieved by the grant of power in the first place.
IV.

METHANEX'S "NATIONAL TREATMENT" ARGUMENT AND
THE TRIBUNAL'S PARTIAL AWARD ON
JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY

Methanex's most telling claim was that California's ban on MTBE
violated the "national treatment" requirement of Article 1102(1). In this
Part, therefore, we elaborate the argument propounded by Methanex and
then take a step back to where the United States challenged the Tribunal's jurisdiction to hear any of Methanex's claims. We do this because
there is very good reason to speculate that the Tribunal's Partial Award
on Jurisdiction decisively influenced its Final Award on the merits. The
latter, issued nearly three years later, denied all of Methanex's claims
including its Article 1102(1) claim. Once we have analyzed the ruling on
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Jurisdiction, we shall turn, in Part V, to the decision on the merits of
Methanex's Article 1102(1) claim. This will be followed in Parts VI and
VII by the Tribunal's decision to dismiss, on the merits, both the Article
1105 (violation of international law) and the Article 1110 (expropriation) claims.
(a)

Methanex's "National Treatment" Argument (Article 1102(1))

Article 1102(1) of NAFTA provides as follows:
1. Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no
less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own
investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion,
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of
investments.5 2
In developing its case under this Article, Methanex established that
between 1993 and 2001 MTBE, with its methanol base, was clearly the
oxygenate of choice in the United States as in California. In 1998, California alone accounted for 132,000 tons of Methanex's MTBE shipment.5 3 Only thirty percent of the methanol needed to produce the
MTBE consumed in California was produced in the United States, while
seventy percent came from abroad.54
Methanex argued that its principal competitors in the California
market for gasoline oxygenates were U.S. ethanol producers who were,
as competitors, domestic investors "in like circumstances" with
Methanex. Made from biomass feed stocks such as corn and other
materials, 55 ethanol was on occasion used to produce ETBE, an oxygenate in ether form similar to MTBE. Far more frequently, however, ethanol was added directly to gasoline through what is called "splashblending," a process that, under federal law,5 6 could not be used to blend
methanol directly into gasoline. 7 In short, to produce "reformulated gasoline," ethanol, as a source of oxygen, was most frequently blended
directly into gasoline, while methanol, also a source of oxygen, was first
reacted with isobutylene to produce MTBE, which was then blended
into the gasoline.
Despite this difference in production method, Methanex argued that
52. North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 7, art. 1102(1).
53. Claimant Methanex Corporation's Draft Amendment Claim at 5, Methanex Corp. v.
United States, 44 I.L.M. 1345 (2005) [hereinafter Draft Amendment Claim].
54. Claimant's Reply to the Statement of Defense at 3, Methanex, 44 I.L.M. 1345.
55. Methanex, 44 I.L.M. at 1368.
56. Id. at 1446.
57. Methanex claimed that methanol, like ethanol, could be used directly as a gasoline
oxygenate-a point contested by the United States. Id. at 1368. The United States also pointed out
that such use was prohibited in the United States by federal law.
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methanol and ethanol "compete[d] for customers in the [same California] oxygenate market."5 8 Since, competition was the most widely recognized test for determining whether investors were "in like
circumstances" 59 under Article 1102(1), California's ban on MTBE,
according to Methanex, discriminated against foreign-produced methanol in favor of U.S. produced ethanol and was, as such, a blatant violation of Article 1102(1).
This basic contention was followed by a number of additional arguments. The purported concern with MTBE in the California groundwater
was, Methanex argued, an utter contrivance, a pure sham. The University of California researchers erred when they concluded that the use of
MTBE in gasoline entailed a "significant" risk of contaminating California's water resources.6 ° This lack of scientific credibility was then compounded by the fact that MTBE in the groundwater was the result of
leakage from the large number of underground gasoline storage tanks
(USTs) that failed to meet state and federal safety standards. When California, instead of taking the cheaper and equally effective course of
enforcing those standards, banned MTBE, ignoring the other demonstrably toxic elements leaking from the defective tanks, it became apparent,
Methanex argued, that the State was not concerned with the safety of its
water supply. It was instead intentionally engaged in discriminating
against methanol made from foreign natural gas in favor of ethanol
made entirely from U.S. grown biomass feedstock.
To punctuate this contention, Methanex charged that the California
legislative process that enacted the MTBE ban was, if not strictly corrupt, unfairly prejudiced against MTBE. This prejudice, Methanex
claimed, was largely fostered by the false publicity, nefarious lobbying
and large campaign contributions of Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), a
firm that controlled nearly seventy percent of American ethanol production.6 Among ADM's more notorious interventions were its large,
albeit legal, contributions to the election campaign of California Governor Grey Davis, its contributions to other California political figures and
a secret meeting between Davis and ADM officers ostensibly to promote
the ban.
V.

THE PARTIAL AWARD ON JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY

At this point we go back to where the United States challenged the
Tribunal's jurisdiction to hear Methanex's claims. For this purpose the
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 1443.
See id.
See id. at 1459.
See id. at 1346.
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United States relied on Article 1101(1) which limits the application of
Chapter 11 "to measures adopted or maintained by a Party relating to:
(a) investors of another Party [or] (b) investments of investors of another
Party in the territory of a Party. '"62
The United States argued that Article 1101(1) required a "legally
significant connection" between the measure complained of-the ban on
MTBE-and the loss suffered by the claimant investor.6 3 Methanex,
according to the United States, as an "investor" in methanol, a mere
"feedstock" to MTBE, lacked the required "legally significant connection" to the MTBE ban. In rebuttal Methanex argued that the ban's
adverse "affect" on methanol as an MTBE feedstock sufficed to meet
the relational threshold established by Article 1101(l). 64 The Tribunal's
initial answer to this issue came in its Preliminary Award on Jurisdiction
and Admissibility of August 7, 2002 ("Partial Award"). 6 5
The Partial Award was divided into two parts. The first related to
Methanex's so-called Original Statement of Claim, charging that the
MTBE ban violated NAFTA Articles 1105 (international law) and 1110
(expropriation). The second pertained to Methanex's Second Amended
Claim charging that the discriminatory effect of the MTBE ban violated
the "national treatment" mandate of Article 1102(1), the requirements of
international law applicable under Article 1105(1), and the prohibition
against uncompensated expropriations in Article 1110(1).
The Tribunal starts its discussion of these jurisdictional challenges
by emphasizing that, in drawing the line between those consequences of
a public measure that can legitimately give rise to a claim under Chapter
11 and those that are too remote, the decision-maker is required by Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention, to attend carefully the "particular
context" within which the question arose. Special care is to be given to
securing a decision that would further the substantive "social polic[ies]
or other value judgment[s]" of the instrument being interpreted.6 6 This
applied, the Tribunal said, whether those policies mandated an expansive interpretation of the instrument's purview or if they necessitated
"restrictions" on the "consequences for which [a particular measure was]
to be held accountable."6 7 Having offered this framework to guide its
jurisdictional inquiry, the Tribunal, in a curious reversal of form,
62. North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 7, art. 1101(1).
63. For this purpose the United States drew on cases denying third parties the right to sue for
injuries sustained when another, the primary party, was victim of a contract breach or a tort.
64. See Reply Memorial of Respondent United States of America on Jurisdiction,
Admissibility and the Proposed Amendment at 43-46, Methanex, 44 I.L.M. 1345.
65. Preliminary Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Methanex, 44 I.L.M 1345.
66. Id. at 65.

67. Id.
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appears to abandon the insight altogether when judging whether
Methanex's claims came within the purview of Chapter 11.
(a)

Jurisdiction-The Original Statement of Claim

As for Methanex's Original Claims under Article 1105 (violation of
international law) and Article 1110 (uncompensated expropriation) the
Tribunal makes short shrift of the jurisdictional issue. It makes no mention whatsoever of the facts, the policies, and the social values that it had
earlier seemed to promise. What is offered instead is a crude caricature
of an analysis. The Tribunal observes that "[t]he possible consequences
of human conduct are infinite, especially when comprising acts of governmental agencies; but common sense does not require that line to run
unbroken towards an endless horizon."6 8 That's the whole of it! On the
basis of this simplistic truism, and nothing more, the Tribunal announces
that "it would have no jurisdiction to hear [the] claim, as pleaded in the
Methanex's Original Statement of Claim."6 9 Of course, the cognizable
horizon of no remedial system is unlimited. Where that limit lies, however, is a matter for analysis within the context of the ordinance whose
scope is being judged, not by a terse aphorism. The Tribunal made no
attempt whatsoever to examine the functional relationship of methanol
to "reformulated gasoline," or to compare that relationship with ethanol's place in the production of the same end-product or to set that relationship in the context of Chapter 11.70 Perhaps there were good
functional reasons to treat Methanex's original claim as falling outside
the cognizance of Chapter 11. But no such reason appears in the Tribunal's explanation. There is nothing but a simplistic truism that served
only to indiscriminately lump Methanol with every minor element in the
reformulated gasoline chain of supply; that "endless horizon" of secondary and tertiary ingredients, their suppliers, shareholders, officers,
employees, etc. This was not a discerning act of contextual treaty interpretation as contemplated by Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 73.
70. The Tribunal was utterly indifferent to the fact that methanol is one of two basic
feedstocks for MTBE, the other isobutelyn; that the United States had admitted that MTBE's was
a competitor of ethanol, a product entirely of domestic origin; that before the California ban,
MTBE was, by a large margin, the oxygenate of choice not only in California but throughout the
United States; that methanol was the active ingredient necessary for MTBE to function as a
gasoline oxygenate in competition with ethanol; that Methanex was the single largest purveyor of
methanol to the California market; that methanol was the only foreign sourced ingredient of the
MTBE produced by integrated refineries constituting Methanex's principal, if not only, California
customers; that methanol represented one-third by weight of the final product and, by virtue of its
price volatility, excised a disproportionate influence on the price of MTBE.
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Jurisdiction-TheAmended Claim

The Tribunal next turned in its Partial Award to the issue of
whether Methanex's Second Amended Claim 7 ' was within the scope of
Chapter 11 as prescribed by Article 1101; whether California's ban on
MTBE "related to" Methanex or its investment in the United States.
Here Methanex had emphasized that by its ban California intended to
harm foreign methanol investors in order to benefit domestic ethanol
investors. The Tribunal commences its discussion by noting that, in the
estimate of both parties, Methanex by this allegation changed the jurisdictional issue from that presented by its Original Claim. The parties
agreed that, "[i]f the purpose of the measure is intent to harm foreignowned investors or investments on the basis of nationality, then the mea72
sure relates to the foreign-owned investor or investment.
The Tribunal then proceeds to review the evidence outlined in
Methanex's Draft Amended Claim purporting to show California's
alleged intent to harm foreign methanol producers. It concludes that
while Methanex's proof might show an intent to harm foreign MTBE
producers that did not suffice to show an intent to harm "suppliers of
goods and services to MTBE producers," such as Methanex. But, then
the Tribunal adds: "Methanex's case does not stop there. It is further
alleged that Governor Davis had a broader objective: to favour ADM
and the US ethanol industry, to penalise 'foreign' MTBE producers and
73
'foreign' methanol producers, such as Methanex."
In short, what the Tribunal was later to call "malign intent,"74
would suffice to bring Methanex's complaint against the ban within the
scope of Chapter 11. The next step, therefore, was to test the credibility
of the proof offered by Methanex on this point.7 5 Methanex was ordered
to produce a fresh pleading with accompanying evidence. Recognizing
that an examination of the alleged intent to harm could also become
"intertwined with the merits," the Tribunal decided to combine both in a
single Final Award.76
71. Methanex's amended claim was presented in two written submissions. The initial
submission was a "Draft" of February 12, 2001 ("Draft Amended Claim" or "Draft Claim"). Draft
Amendment Claim, supra note 53. The Tribunal had the Draft Claim very much in mind when it
issued its Partial Award. In anticipation of the Tribunal's review as promised of the jurisdictional
issue in its final award on the merits Methanex's second written submission was shaped largely in
response to the Tribunal's Partial Award and was formally designated the "Amended Statement of
Claim," dated November 5, 2002. Amended Statement of Claim, Methanex Corp. v. United
States, 44 I.L.M. 1345 (2005).
72. Preliminary Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supra note 65, at 73.
73. Id. at 75.
74. See Methanex, 44 I.L.M. at 1443.
75. Preliminary Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supra note 65, at 74-75.
76. See id. at 77.
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Apart from alleging that by its ban on MTBE California intended to
harm foreign methanol producers, Methanex in its Draft Amended
Claim and again in its formal Amended Statement of Claim made clear
its contention that, as a foreign investor, it was in direct competition
with U.S. ethanol producers and that this sufficed to bring it within the
protection of Chapter 11. Not so, in the Tribunal's mind. To the Tribunal, an intent to harm foreign methanol producers-"malign intent"would establish the jurisdictional nexus required by Article 1101(1), but
market competition with domestic ethanol producers would not.77 The
arbitral record repeatedly establishes how utterly irrelevant the Tribunal
deemed competition between methanol and ethanol to be on the question
of its jurisdiction to hear Methanex's complaint.
For example, after Methanex had replied to the United States'
Statement of Defense, the United States issued a Rejoinder, 78 noting that
the Tribunal, in its Partial Award, had assumed the truth of Methanex's
allegations regarding competition but had concluded that those allegations did not suffice in establishing a legally significant connection. The
award held, according to the United States, that "[th]e ... Partial Award
...by its operative terms, excludes the possibility that the alleged "competition" Methanex now relies upon could establish the requisite connection between the measures and Methanex or its investments. 7 9
Later, in its Final Award, the Tribunal takes particular notice of and
offers no objection to the United States' statement that the Tribunal's
Partial Award.8 °
Notably the Tribunal is careful to state that proof of an "intent to
harm"-a "malign intent"-was not a necessary condition for invoking
Chapter Il's grant of "direct effect."'" It was, however, a sufficient condition. If proven, an "intent to harm" would establish jurisdiction. If not
proven, other factors would have to be examined. However, the Tribunal
categorically rejects the idea that injury to a competitive relationship
could be one of those other factors. In this respect the decision is sweeping in its import. But first and foremost, it is a conceptual error of major
proportions, an error aggressively repeated by the United States.
The foundation rationale for opening national markets to capitaland to goods and services-from abroad is to secure the welfare gains
77. Nowhere does the Tribunal recognize that even if not sufficient, in itself, to establish the
required relationship, the existence of a competitive relationship between foreign methanol
producers and domestic ethanol producers might be considered evidence to strengthen the
possibility of a required intent to harm.
78. Rejoinder of Respondent United States of America, Methanex, 44 I.L.M. 1345.
79. Id. at 17.
80. See Methanex, 44 I.L.M. at 1458.
81. Id. at 1375.
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that comparative advantage makes possible. Those gains presuppose, in
turn, free markets operating with the discipline, the transparency, and
the efficiency that competitive markets alone can secure. While we traditionally don't express it in the following terms, it can be useful, on
occasion, to recognize the fundamental fact that even if a domestic market is highly protected so long as it is also vigorously competitive nothing is to be gained by opening that market to capital or to goods and
services from abroad unless the latter can bring additional competitive
forces to bear; unless they put additional downward pressure on prices,
enhance the quality of the goods or services being sold or the terms upon
which capital is made available, or offer new products or services from
which to choose. In the context of an agreement such as NAFTA the
requirement that foreign investors be accorded "national treatment" represents nothing less than recognition of this elemental fact. It recognizes
the need to prevent governments from interfering in the competitive process, to assure that where domestic and foreign investors are competitors
in the national market the competitive relationship is not distorted by
discriminatory governmental measures.8 2 Necessarily, therefore, it is
that relationship-the effect on competition of a measure such as the
ban on MTBE-that must ultimately determine which foreign investors
stand in an approximate enough relation to that measure to warrant
extending them the right to pursue a remedy under Chapter 11.
There is absolutely no excuse for the Tribunal's failure to understand and build on this foundational principle. By the time it came to
fashioning its Final Award, Methanex had called the Tribunal's attention
to two lines of uncontradicted decisions establishing that, on the merits
of an Article 1102(1) claim, proof that the claimant foreign investor was
in competition with the domestic investor allegedly favored by the challenged governmental measure was the key to establishing that the foreign and domestic investors were "in like circumstances." The first
consisted of GATT/WTO cases, the single most authoritative body of
international law on "national treatment." The second consisted of decisions by other NAFTA tribunals construing Article 1102(1). These citation were then supported by citations to official studies from the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),8 3 by the
United States Department of the Treasury,8 4 by Executive testimony
82. The one fundamental exception to this rule is the "tariff," the tax at the border that, by
definition, discriminates against the foreign-sourced product or service. Under treaties such as
NAFTA and the WTO, however, while nations may discriminate by imposing tariffs against
foreign competitors, they must, at the same time, be willing to put those tariffs on the table for
reduction and eventual elimination through reciprocal negotiation.
83. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., NATIONAL TREATMENT 1 (1999).
84. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, NATIONAL TREATMENT STUDY 13 (1994).
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before Congress, 85 and by the writings86 of some of the most distinguished experts in international trade law. 87 If proof of competition was
critical to success on the merits of a foreign investor's Article 1102(1)
claim, it could hardly be less critical in assuring that a Chapter 11 Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear that claim.
How do we explain this inexcusable default? We have no reason to
charge the Tribunal with incompetence or of harboring some preconceived hostility to Methanex because it challenged California's popular
environmental cause. Under these circumstances, we are compelled to
assign the Tribunal's profound conceptual default to its intellectual disposition. Reflective of its noncontextual formalist mind-set much of the
Tribunal's Partial Award on Jurisdiction is devoted to an abstract discourse on the meaning of the phrase "relating to." For this purpose, the
Tribunal purports to draw meaning out of a decision by the International
Court of Justice and out of a number of legal ordinances other than
NAFTA. It takes comfort in long citations proffered by the United States
to show that tort, contract law, and various international delicts all limit
the "remoteness of the damage" for which remedies are available.8 8 But
in this discourse the Tribunal gives no thought whatsoever to whether
the circumstances attendant those references were apposite to the circumstances of the Methanex claim or, more significantly, to the purposes of NAFTA, especially Chapter 11. The Tribunal operates in an
utterly abstract methodological world, paying absolutely no attention to
the underlying purposes of the ordinance being interpreted and the economic and political assumptions that inform that purpose.
On a more immediate level the Methanex Tribunal's interpretation
of Article 1101(1), if followed by other tribunals, could profoundly
restrict the number of claimed violations of "national treatment" (Article
1102(1)) that would be cognizable under Chapter 11. In fact, the decision created a vast opening for nations to follow deliberately discriminatory (i.e., protectionist) commercial and financial policies; this is hardly
a result consonant with the larger purposes of the NAFTA enterprise.
85. National Treatment in Policy and Practice in the United States and Abroad: Hearings
Before the H. Subcomm. on FinancialInstitutions Supervision, Regulation and Insuranceof the H.
Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong. 3 (1990) (testimony of David
Mulford, Undersecretary of the Treasury for International Affairs).
86. R. Hudec, "Like Products": The Differences in Meaning in GATT Articles I and III, in
REGULATORY BARRIERS

AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NoN-DSCRIMINATION

IN WORLD TRADE LAW

(Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2000).
87. The references to these several authorities by Methanex are to be found at pages 120
through 125 of Methanex's Amended Statement of Claim. See Claimant Methanex Corporation's
Second Amended Statement of Claim at 120-25, Methanex Corp. v. United States, 44 I.L.M.
1345 (2005) [hereinafter Second Amended Statement of Claim].
88. Preliminary Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supra note 65, at 65.
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Note that the Tribunal expressly admitted that a foreign investor
producing MTBE would have standing to bring a claim under Chapter
11.89 We take this to mean two things. First, that a foreign investor producing the same product as a domestic investor would have standing to
challenge a discriminatory measure against its product if that measure
would distort the competitive relationship between the two. Second, a
foreign investor with a product technically different yet competitive with
that of a domestic investor could not invoke the protection of Chapter 11
even though the challenged measure was as injurious to the competitive
relationship between the two as in the case of the measure targeted at the
same product. Of course, it remains to be seen where, under this scheme,
the line is to be drawn between a foreign product that is the same as the
domestic and the merely competitive foreign product. The line is not
self-evident.
This uncertainty aside, consider the protectionist possibilities of the
distinction. A great variety of products made in the United States by
foreign-owned companies are vigorously competitive with products of
American owned enterprises but are mechanically, chemically, biologically, or otherwise technically very different from their American competitors. Are all these foreign investors to be denied Chapter 11
protection? If not, that would only be because of their competitive relationship to the domestic investors' product. But if, as the Tribunal makes
clear, a competitive relationship cannot suffice to warrant that protection, governments are left completely free despite their "national treatment" obligation to discriminate against any foreign producer of a
competitive nonidentical product that threatens their own industry.
For example, consider the pharmaceutical industry. Given the effect
of the patent laws, there is a high probability that any foreign investor
producing in the United States a drug functionally designed to treat the
same maladies and intended to be marketed as a competitor of a product
of an American owned pharmaceutical firm would nevertheless be
chemically different from the latter. Would the Tribunal's formulation of
Chapter I l's scope deny the foreign investor access to the rights conferred by that Chapter? If so, it would mean that a foreign investor with
only a competitive product could get relief against a discriminatory measure only by persuading its own government to either espouse its cause
diplomatically or pursue the offending NAFTA Member through an
Article 20 arbitration. And if this is so, the Tribunal would have openedup for the NAFTA governments a vast opportunity to employ discriminatory (i.e., protectionist) measures against foreign investors.
Moreover, unless the investor's government can find, as a predicate
89. See id. at 74.
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for its claim on behalf of the investor, a "national treatment" requirement in some other Chapter of NAFTA,9 ° it will have to deal with the
Methanex Tribunal's denial of jurisdiction over Methanex's Chapter 11
claim. Recall that the Tribunal's decision was under Article 1101(1).
That Article applies to all claims under Article 1102(1) ("national treatment") not under just cases invoking the grant of "direct effect." In
short, if the investor's own government is to pursue a claim that a treaty
partner violated "national treatment" in the case of a product that is only
competitive with that partner's product, it will have to succeed in overriding the Methanex tribunal's jurisdictional decision. That decision is
not precedent but, if later tribunals have followed it, the need on the part
of the investor's government to override becomes much more difficult
and is likely to loom as a reason not to take-up the investor's claim,
especially if that government contemplates filing a Chapter 20 arbitration. Here the irony enters.
The Methanex Tribunal's position on jurisdiction originated with
counsel for the United States-members of the State Department's
Legal Advisor's office. It was apparent when NAFTA was drafted and it
continues to be apparent today that the flow of capital from the United
States out to Mexico and Canada will, for the indefinite future, exceed
by some significant margin the flow from Mexico and Canada into the
United States. Unless one is prepared to attribute to the U.S. NAFTA
negotiators and to the U.S. Congress that approved their draft an
extraordinary naivet6 or of harboring a hidden opposition to the interests
of American investors, it is difficult to see how the position taken by the
State Department's Legal Advisor did not directly contradict the American intentions with regard to Chapter 11, intentions in which the other
NAFTA parties acquiesced. 91 If so, it again raises the difficult question
90. For example, if the discriminatory measure in question applies not just to investors'
investments in the offending NAFTA member but to goods imported by the investor into that
country as well and the case otherwise qualifies under NAFTA Article 301(1) the government
might rely on Article 111(4) of GATT, which Article 301(1) of NAFTA makes applicable to intraNAFTA trade in goods. One difficulty with this is that Article 111(4) of GATT only protects "like"
products not "competitive or substitutable products." Whether, for example, methanol would
qualify as a "like product" to ethanol under the rather flexible interpretation that has been given
that term in certain GATT decisions is an open question.
91. Again we encounter that pervasive question of why, and under what authority, does the
State Department in defending the United States under a Chapter 1I challenge, advocate for
interpretations of NAFTA that are plainly contrary to the best interests of the U.S. business
community and of the broader foreign-policy objectives of fashioning closer and more extended
economic relations between the United States and its North American partners. The issue is
particularly pertinent when it is remembered that the liberal probusiness and prointegration
interpretations that the legal adviser's counsel for the United States appears so reluctant to
embrace were precisely the interpretations intended by both the drafters of the text and by
Congress when, in furtherance of its Constitutional responsibility, it approved that text.
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already alluded to. In the Methanex case did the Legal Advisor's office
play more the role of private counsel defending a client at all costs than
that of a public servant charged with furthering the public interest? And
if so, is that role consonant with the broader interests of the State
Department or the U.S. Executive? If not, does that signal a broader
reality; as Respondent in these Chapter 11 actions can the U.S. government ever assume the broad tactical freedom of a self-interested private
litigant?
These questions aside, it appears fair to conclude that in all of its
work on the jurisdictional requirements of Chapter l Ithe Methanex Tribunal was captive to its noncontextual formalist mind-set. It gives every
evidence of an intellectual disposition that sees "law" as an autonomous
social convention with its own, well-established interpretive method.
This is a convention that ultimately rejects, as dangerously idiosyncratic,
any interpretive process in which the meaning of words are consciously
and carefully crafted to fit the potentially, sometimes very elusive,
social, political, and economic premises upon which the treaty's purposes rest. It is an intellectual disposition whose rigidly narrow compass
will, if allowed to prevail, ultimately undermine much of the reformative
design of the NAFTA enterprise.
VI.

MERITS OF THE "NATIONAL TREATMENT" CLAIM (ARTICLE

1102)

The Treaty provision specifically applicable to Methanex's case is
Article 1102(3), which states as follows:
The treatment accorded by a Party under [Article 1102] paragraphs 1
and 2 means, with respect to a state or province, treatment no less
favorable than the most favorable treatment accorded, in like circumstances, by that state or province to investors, and
to investments of
92
investors, of the Party of which it forms a part.
At this point we turn to the merits as disposed of under the Tribunal's
Final Award. Here Methanex argued that it stood in "like circumstances" with United States producers of ethanol who were not subject
to any ban on the use of their product as an oxygenate. Yet, that the
ethanol producers were effectively Methanex's principal competitors in
the California gasoline oxygenate market and competition, Methanex
contended, was the key to "like circumstances." The argument, however,
posed a problem. Nearly three years earlier the Tribunal in its Partial
Award on Jurisdiction had unequivocally declared that proof of competition between domestic and foreign investors was irrelevant to determining whether discriminatory measures against the latter were within the
92. North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 7, art. 1102(3).
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remedial powers of a Chapter 11 Tribunal.9 3 If competition between foreign and domestic investors did not give the Tribunal jurisdiction to
judge whether the California ban violated Article 1102, it is difficult to
see how proof of the same competition could be used to establish that
Article 1102 had been violated. Yet, Methanex pressed on, citing, as we
have already seen, GATT/WTO, other NAFTA cases, and a string of
authoritative statements by United Nations Commission on Trade and
Development ("UNCTAD"), by U.S. executive branch representatives to
Congress and by some of the world's leading trade lawyers.94
Unmoved by these authorities, the Tribunal had its own dilemma to
solve. If following the logic of its Partial Award on Jurisdiction, it was
necessary to discard competition as a test for when foreign and domestic
investors stood in "like circumstances," the Tribunal had to devise some
alternative standard for identifying which, if any, domestic investor
stood within that qualifying relationship with Methanex. To this end it
seized on a test proposed by the United States-the search for an appropriate "domestic comparator."
(a)

Search for the "Domestic Comparator"

The Tribunal starts its discussion of what it called the U.S. methodology for determining "like circumstances" by noting that, in the U.S.
view, "national treatment" is concerned with "nationality based discrimination" and that therefore
[t]he function of addressing [that form] of discrimination is served by
comparing the treatment of the foreign investor to the treatment
accorded to a domestic investor that is most similarly situated to it. In
ideal circumstance, the foreign investor ... should be compared to a
domestic investor ... that is like it in all relevant respects, but for
nationality of ownership....
... [W]here [however] there is no identical domestically-owned
counterpart to the foreign-owned investment.., a tribunal may look
farther a field and expand the scope of domestically-owned comparators as long as they are similar enough to justify considering their
circumstances to be "like" that of the foreign investor .... 95
93. This, of course, meant that the Tribunal could hear the merits of Methanex's "national
treatment" complaint only because Methanex had also alleged and was being given a chance to
prove that the California ban was motivated by a "malign intent" to injure foreign methanol
producers and because the inquiry under this test was likely to be so entwined with the merits that
the Tribunal had decided to hear both at one time.
94. See Second Amended Statement of Claim, supra note 87, at 120-25.
95. Methanex Corp. v. United States, 44 I.L.M. 1345, 1444 (2005). The Tribunal, does, as
noted, quote the statement by the United States that "national treatment" was concerned with
"nationality based discrimination." If intended as a statement of the policy underlying the national
treatment mandate of NAFTA Article 1102, it's pathetic and not worth a moment's attention.
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The Tribunal then describes Methanex's contention under Article
1102(3) in the following terms:
Methanex and other [foreign] methanol producers [were] in like circumstances with US domestic ethanol producers because they both
produce oxygenates used in manufacturing reformulated gasoline and
because they compete for customers in the oxygenate market ...
[T]he fact that methanol and ethanol are used in slightly different
ways does not affect the existence of a competitive relationship
96

Having reviewed these so-called "methodologies" 97 the Tribunal
asks who is Methanex's proper comparator. Falling completely into U.S.
hands, the Tribunal proclaims the death of Methanex's case:
Given the object of Article 1102 and the flexibility which the provision provides in its adoption of "like circumstances," it would be as
perverse to ignore identical comparators if they were available and to
use comparators that were less "like," as it would be perverse to
refuse to find and apply less 'like' comparators when no identical
comparators existed. The difficulty which Methanex encounters in
this regard is that there are comparators which are identical to it.
• . . [T]here is a substantial methanol industry in the United
States . . . [engaged] in marketing and production . . . just like
Methanex .... The California ban had precisely the same effect on
the American investors and investments as it had on the Canadian
investor Methanex.
• . . The fact stands-Methanex did not receive less favourable
treatment than the identical domestic comparators, producing
methanol.9 8
The striking thing about this portion of the Tribunal's Final Award is
that because foreign and domestic investors produce the "same" product
(methanol) they are conclusively deemed to be "in like circumstances."
More than that, in any case where one can identify producers of the
same product, they become the only investors deemed to be in "like
96. Id. at 1443.
97. Under Methanex's criteria, the "domestic comparators" would appear to include such of
those U.S. owned domestic methanol producers that, prior to the California ban, contributed to the
MTBE produced for the California reformulated gasoline market and those U.S. owned domestic
ethanol producers that, before the ban, supplied the same California market and after the ban
virtually took over that market. In the course of reviewing the Parties' different "methodologies"
for determining "like circumstance," the Tribunal wrongly and very unfairly asserts that the
Methanex's "methodology begins by assuming that its comparator is the ethanol industry." Id. at
1445. That is simply not true. Methanex starts by asserting that "competition" is the key to "like
circumstances" and then proceeds to search out the domestic investor or investors that are in
"competition" with foreign methanol producers. If required to follow the U.S. nomenclature, it
then identifies those competitors as its "domestic comparator."
98. Id. at 1445.
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circumstances." 9 9 The criterion of comparability is "product identity"
and that criterion is preclusive of any other standard.
But why? We are never told. The hard truth is that the Tribunal tied
to its noncontextual formalist convictions was unable, or unwilling, to
explain in basic economic and political terms why product identity
should be the talisman of "like circumstances."'' 00 Later, we shall see
that it tries with utterly unconvincing results to use the NAFTA text to
eliminate market competition as the criterion of comparability.
First, however, at one very simple level the conceptual defect in the
Tribunal's criteria is transparent. By far the greater portion of the
world's methanol production is used in the manufacture of formaldehyde, not MTBE. Suppose all of the domestic methanol producers were
selling their output exclusively to formaldehyde manufacturers. In this
case, no one, not even the Methanex Tribunal, would suggest that the
domestic and the foreign producers were in "like circumstances." The
domestic investors would not be subject to the ban of which the foreign
investors complain and hence would not be in "like circumstances" with
the foreign at least for purposes of finding a alternative "comparator"
that would free domestic producers from the strictures of Article
1102(1). This simple example immediately suggests that the market in
which an investor's product is sold has something to do with comparability and that, on that basis, the Tribunal would, under our simple
example, be compelled to recognize domestic ethanol as Methanex's
domestic comparator. Apart from the Tribunal's failure to put the
Methanex case in its broader NAFTA based theoretical context, it failed
simply to think through the criteria it was using.
Needless to add, the Tribunal's decision cuts deeply against the
reformative and integrative force of NAFTA's "national treatment"
requirement. And without question, this occurs because the Tribunal,
constrained by its noncontextual formalist convictions, makes no inquiry
whatsoever into the purpose of NAFTA's "national treatment" ordinance, the very ordinance it was charged with interpreting. Not a word!
Not a word was said about comparative advantage and the gains to
national welfare it renders possible. Apparently national economic
growth is not something tribunals need worry about in settling disputes
under Chapter 11. Certainly there was no reflection on the role competition might play in assuring the realization of that growth. The Tribunal
99. There is of course no reflection on the difficulties of determining "sameness" of products.
What degree of chemical, biological, mechanical, or other physical variation is still to be allowed
within the definition of a particular product?
100. It is worth noting that a common product identity will not always be the basis for
determining "like circumstances."
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exhibits no awareness whatsoever of why a national treatment requirement might be included in an agreement concerned with investment liberalization, why it may be necessary to interdict discriminatory
governmental intervention in the competitive process. And no alternative policy was offered. True, the United States described Article 1102
as "concerned with nationality based discrimination." But if intended as
policy guidance, its superficiality is shocking. It leaves the Tribunal
bereft of any rational framework whatsoever for identifying the domestic investors that were in "like circumstances" with the foreign. And in
consequence of this intellectual void-this inability to link national
treatment with market integration-the Tribunal only succeeds in interposing the traditional boundaries of national sovereignty against
NAFTA's emphasis on continental economic integration while, in so
doing, cutting deeply against "direct effect's" assault on the realist's
political paradigm. Once again the noncontextual formalist tradition
plays out as a first line of defense against a new, more democratic, more
economically encompassing and disciplined system of governance for
the global economy.
(b)

Competition and the NAFTA Text

Perhaps responding to Methanex's repeated assertion that competition was the standard for determining "like circumstances," the Tribunal,
in a classic noncontextual formalist move, attempts to demonstrate from
the NAFTA text, and the text alone, that competition between foreign
and domestic investors had no role whatsoever to play in making that
determination. This is the Tribunal's most extended effort to refute
Methanex' s contention. As such it is an extraordinary example of textual
manipulation conducted without any serious attention to the economicpolitical order that the text was intended to foster and the economic,
political, and institutional theories that supplied the rationale for that
order. The text alone determines the result and the text is pure abstraction such that the society with which it purports to be concerned is an
utterly exogenous, even alien, phenomenon.
The Tribunal first notes that paragraph (1) of Article 301 of
NAFTA makes the "national treatment" provisions of GATT Article III
applicable to sales of goods under NAFTA. It then goes on to quote
paragraph (2) of NAFTA Article 301 as follows:
The provisions of paragraph 1 regarding national treatment shall
mean, with respect to a state or province, treatment no less favorable
than the most favorable treatment accorded by such state or province
to any like, directly competitive or substitutable goods, as the case
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may be, of the Party of which it forms a Part. l 0 '
The Tribunal then reviews several NAFTA Chapters 0 2 to conclude that
"the drafters of NAFTA were careful and precise about the use of the
words 'any like, directly competitive or substitutable goods,' on one
hand, and the words "like circumstances" on the other."' °3 "Like,
directly competitive or substitutable goods"-what the Tribunal labels
"trade criteria"-are never used with respect to investments. Investments together with technical barriers to trade in services are referenced
solely by the words "like circumstances." The Tribunal then adds:
It may ... be assumed that if the drafters of NAFTA had wanted to
incorporate trade criteria in its investment chapter by engrafting a
GATT-type formula, they could have produced a version of Article
1102 stating "Each Party shall accord to investors .. .of another
Party treatment no less favorable than it accords its own investors, in
like circumstances, with respect to any like, directly competitive or
substitutable goods." It is clear from this constructive exercise how
incongruous, indeed odd, would be the juxtaposition in a single provision dealing with investment of "like circumstances" and "any like,
directly competitive or substitutable goods."
* * * In any event, the drafter did not insert the above italicised
words in Article 1102; and it would be unwarranted for a tribunal
interpreting the provision to act as if they had, unless there were clear
indications elsewhere in the text that, at best, the drafters wished to
do so or, at least, that they were not opposed to doing so. In fact, the
intent of the drafters to create distinct regimes for trade and investment is explicit in Article 1139's definition of investment." °
After discussing Article 1139 the Tribunal concludes:
The issue here is not the relevance of general international law ... or
the theoretical possibility of construing a provision of NAFTA by
reference to another treaty of the parties, for example the GATT.
International law directs this Tribunal, first and foremost, to the text;
here, the text and the drafters' intentions, which it manifests, show
that trade provisions were not to be transported to investment provisions. Accordingly, the Tribunal holds that Article 1102 is to be read
like, directly competitive or
on its own terms not as if the words 1"any
0 5
substitutable goods" appeared in it.
101. North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 7, art. 301.
102. The Tribunal notes that NAFTA Chapter 7, relating to sanitary and phytosanitary
measures, applies "national treatment" only to "like goods," excluding any reference to
"competitive or substitutable goods" and that NAFTA Chapter 9, covering standards related
measures, accords "national treatment" to imports of "like goods" and to foreign service providers
that stand in "like circumstances" with a domestic provider. Methanex, 44 I.L.M. at 1447.
103. Id.at 1448.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1449.
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The Tribunal's exposition is scarcely an exemplar of clarity. Nevertheless, focusing on paragraphs 34 and 35116 it would seem that the Tribunal's argument goes as follows. When in Paragraph (2) of NAFTA
Article 301 dealing with trade in goods, the drafters wanted to apply the
"national treatment" mandate found in Paragraph (1) to both "like
goods," on one hand, and "directly competitive or substitutable goods,"
as the case may be, on the other, they were careful to say so. Apparently
in the Tribunal's mind this last phrase-"directly competitive or substitutable"-thus becomes something of a talisman-so much so that when
it was not used in Article 1102, relating to investments, its absence signaled a deliberate intention by the drafters not to accord "national treatment" to foreign investors whose product was only "competitive," not
identical to that of the domestic investor. The Tribunal seems to find this
conclusion re-enforced by the fact that throughout NAFTA the draftsmen never used the phrase "directly competitive or substitutable goods"
in connection with investments but only with regard to trade in goods.
Once again we encounter a curious interpretive tendency of the Tribunal. When it finds a phrase used in one context that is absent from
another, it reads that absence as signally a deliberate negative intention
on the part of the drafters to exclude from the latter context the object or
conduct to which the phrase relates.
In a more simplified version the Tribunal may be read as saying
that, when the words "directly competitive or substitutable goods" were
not included in Article 1102, it was not for the Tribunal to read those
words into that Article by according equal treatment to foreign investors
whose products were only "competitive" but not identical with those of
domestic investors.
There are a number of problems with either of these readings of the
NAFTA text. The most obvious is triggered by the words "as the case
may be" in Article 301(2). These words are a clear signal that the reference to "like, directly or substitutable goods" in that Article is a
response to a particular technical problem posed by Article III of GATT
such that the absence of any reference to "competitive" goods in the
investment Chapter of NAFTA has no significance whatsoever.
Under GATT there is a traditionally recognized but not always easily applied distinction between "like products" and "competitive or substitutable products."' 7 Under GATT Article III "competitive or
106. See id. at 1448.
107. In GATT "like products" is a term with certain flexibility. It appears throughout the
GATT and tends to have different shades of meaning according to the particular textual context.
Definitions tend to focus primarily on physical characteristics but in some cases consumer
preference is treated as a not inconsiderable factor.
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substitutable products" are granted "national treatment" protection only
from discriminatory "tax measures." 1 8 With respect to all other discriminatory laws, regulations, decrees etc., the guaranty of "national treatment" extends only to "like products" not "competitive or substitutable
products." Now, recall that Article 301(1) of NAFTA applies GATT
Article III to trade in goods between NAFTA members and observe the
function of the phrase "as the case may be" in NAFTA Article 301(2).
The NAFTA draftsmen were simply making sure that in applying GATT
Article IlI to NAFTA, if foreign goods were either "like" or "directly
competitive or substitutable" with domestic goods and the domestic
enjoyed a discriminatory tax benefit, the foreign goods would receive
"national treatment" protection. If, on the other hand, the domestic
goods benefited not from a tax measure but from some other type of
discriminatoryregulation, the foreign goods could claim "national treatment" protection only if the foreign goods were "like" the domestic.
That's all the NAFTA draftsmen were doing. That's why they used the
phrase, "as the case may be." Under Article 301(2), if the discriminatory
regulation was a tax measure, then the protection was broader (it reached
"competitive" goods); if it was another form of regulatory discrimination, then the protection was less expansive (it reached only "like"
goods"). In short, depending on the type of the discriminatory regulation, national treatment protection was' to be applied either to "like"
goods or to "like and competitive goods" "as the case may be." That's
all. And this rule applied only to goods traded under Chapters 3 through
8 (excluding Chapter 7) of NAFTA. It did not apply to investments
under Chapter 11. The point was clear. The NAFTA draftsmen were not
fashioning an interpretive paradigm whose absence from Chapter 11
would signal an intent to withhold "national treatment" from foreign
investors who were only "competitive" with those of a comparable
domestic investor.0 9 So much for the style of formalist construction that
seems to have enamored the Tribunal.
Moreover, if the drafters were, as the Tribunal emphasized, "fluent"
in GATT law, the omission from Article 1102 of the reference to "competitive" goods found in Article 301(2), may be thought to have quite a
different implication. When it came to investments the drafters appear to
108. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 111,Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S.
188 [hereinafter GATT].
109. There is, in passing, a small question about "like products." Remember that the phrase in
NAFTA Article 301(2) that the Tribunal thought signaled a denial of "national treatment" to
"competitive" products of foreign investors also included "like products." Yet "like" products
would certainly seem to include "identical" products under the Tribunal's "domestic comparator"
test. How are the Tribunal's statutory interpretation and its analytic methodology to be reconciled?
This just further evidences that the Tribunal's "domestic comparator" test and its attempt to find in
the NAFTA text grounds for denying Methanex's claim are both simply not credible.
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have carefully avoided referring to investors by the "products" they produced or sold, whether in terms of the very narrow GATT concept of
"like products" or the somewhat more inclusive GATT concept of "competitive or substitutable" products. They chose instead a new and as yet
undefined term. They spoke of investors "in like circumstances." The

word "like" imports comparability and the word "circumstances" is certainly far more capacious than merely a "type of product" however
defined. "Like circumstance" could very readily encompass two firms,
one domestic the other foreign, engaged in competition within the same
market. Whether it does or does not is an issue to be resolved in a manner that best serves the policy underlying the grant of "national treat-

ment" protection to foreign investors, an issue, in short, that lies well
beyond the capacity of any "pure theory" of law to resolve.
That policy, in turn, engages the question of the purpose served by

the grant of "national treatment" within the larger context of NAFTA's
liberalizing and market-integrating objectives. And once again we
encounter the fundamental grounding of the NAFTA enterprise in the

doctrine of comparative advantage and the role of market competition in
assuring that the welfare gains that comparative advantage promises are

fully realized. Within that construct it is critical that foreign investors are
assured that the competitive vigor they bring to the domestic market is
not undermined by discriminatory governmental laws and regulations. 10o

The extent to which the Tribunal lost sight of this policy-what NAFTA
was all about' '-left the member nation-states free, under a broad

range of circumstances, to pursue an intentionally protectionist policy
110. Possibly one can find a justification for the Tribunal's interpretation of Article 1102(3) by
setting aside comparative advantage and adverting to a more primitive rooting in traditional
mercantilism under which "national treatment" would be seen generally as a disfavored
"concession" against national welfare-analogous to a tariff "concession"-justified only as a
bargaining chip in obtaining like "concessions" from a foreign market. There is, however, a
pragmatic problem with this rationale for a narrow reading of Article 1102(1), a reading that
disregards comparative advantage and the instrumental value of competition. If we adopt the selfinterest motif of the mercantilist model, it is virtually unthinkable that the United States, in its
NAFTA bargain, would opt for a narrow definition of the "national interest" commitment to its
investors. The bargain was with Mexico and Canada. It was then and continues to be apparent that
the flow of capital from the United States out to Mexico and Canada will, for the indefinite future,
exceed by some significant margin the flow from Mexico and Canada into the United States.
Unless the Tribunal was prepared to credit the U.S. negotiators of NAFTA with extraordinary
naivetd, the Tribunal's narrow interpretation of Article 1102(1), seen solely as a pragmatic
exercise in neomercantilist bargaining, is utterly untenable.
111. Again we encounter that pervasive question of why, and under what authority, does the
State Department, in defending the United States under a Chapter 11 challenge, advocate for
interpretations of NAFTA that are plainly contrary to the best interests of the U.S. business
community and of the broader foreign-policy objectives of fashioning closer and more extended
economic relations between the United States and its North American partners. The issue is
particularly pertinent when it is remembered that the liberal probusiness and prointegration
interpretations that the State Department appears so reluctant to embrace were precisely the
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without having to offer any claim of public necessity for their action11 2
nothing but unmitigated protectionism.
(c)

Methanol and Ethanol as Competitors

In this part of its Award, the Tribunal very briefly, and quite casually, concludes that even if arguendo "competition"-what the Tribunal
calls "trade law criterion"-were used to determine whether methanol

and ethanol investors were "in like circumstances," it wouldn't matter
because methanol and ethanol are not, in point of fact, competitive products. The argument is naYve and ultimately shows how far the Tribunal
wandered from any clear understanding of the functional relationship
between methanol, MTBE, and ethanol. In discussing this point, however, there is a caveat. The ensuing discussion does not purport to offer
any independent judgment as to whether from all relevant market evi-

dence methanol and ethanol were in fact competitors in the California
reformulated-gasoline market. The assessment here is more limited. It is
based only on such facts and arguments as are found in the Tribunal's
Final Award.

Methanex starts building its case for competition by referring to its
contract with the Valero Refining and Marketing Company, under which
Valero had the right to reduce or cease purchase of methanol from

Methanex in an amount equal to any reduction in demand for MTBE
caused by "a law" adversely affecting Valero's production of and

demand for MTBE in California. Under the California ban this provision
would, Methanex claimed, cause Valero to "stop buying methanol from
'
Methanex and instead buy ethanol."113
Methanex then adds a list of other major integrated California gasoline refineries that had commenced or announced a decision to cominterpretations intended by both the drafters of the text and by Congress when, in furtherance of its
Constitutional responsibility, it approved that text.
112. Consider the case of a NAFTA member with a domestic market in which domestic and
foreign investors compete vigorously but where the foreign investors product is not technically
"identical" to that of the domestic investors. Under the Tribunal's interpretation of "national
treatment," the NAFTA government in question can, even if foreign investors control fifty percent
to eighty percent of its market, ban the foreigners outright from its market or take any other
discriminatory action against them that it chooses, for any reason it chooses, provided it includes
within its discriminatory decree at least one domestic firm producing a product "identical" to the
foreign investors' product-one domestic investor to act as "domestic comparator" and set the
standard for treatment of all foreign investors. For this pattern of discrimination the NAFTA
government needs no excuse, no claim of public necessity, no need to secure a vital domestic
industry, no rationale other than pure unadulterated protectionism. This also means that the only
occasion when a discriminatory action against a foreign investor-even a foreign investor
"identical" to a domestic investor-can violate Article 1102(1) is if the discriminatory measure is,
by its terms, applicable exclusively to "foreign investors.
113. Second Amended Statement of Claim, supra note 87, at 30.
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mence phasing out purchases of methanol to be replaced by ethanol, use
of the latter presumably to be by wholesale distributors with an appropriate adjustment in the price of the base gasoline stock."l 4 The list
included British Petroleum, the largest gasoline supplier to the California market. It adds that Shell Oil was committed to entirely replace
MTBE with ethanol by 2003, that Phillips Petroleum had already
phased-out up to eighty percent of its MTBE production in favor of ethanol, 5 and that Exxon-Mobil intended to blend sixty percent of the gasoline sold in the State with ethanol by early 2003. Methanex then sums up
all of this evidence by reference to a speech that the Governor of
Nebraska gave in 2002 to the annual meeting of the "American Coalition for Ethanol" claiming that the replacement of methanol by ethanol
in California "should create a new 500-million-gallons-a-year market
[for ethanol].""' 6 Largely upon this record Methanex rests its case that
producers of reformulated gasoline for the California market had a
"binary choice" between ethanol and methanol based MTBE as the oxygenate necessary to meet federal standards.
Methanex also pointed out that prior to the ban, MTBE was far
more popular than ethanol both in California and elsewhere in the
United States." 7 Reasons for this preference included the fact that
according to one 2001 report MTBE was nearly twenty-three percent
cheaper to produce than ethanol despite the significant tax credits available to the latter." 8 In 1997 and 1998 the California Environmental Protection Agency concluded that MTBE was the oxygenate of choice in
that State because inter alia its high octane rating, beneficial "dilution
effect on undesirable gasoline components," ease of mixing with gasoline, and ease of distribution."' 9 In short, given the "binary choice"
available in the market-place prior to the ban and given all the reasons
for preferring methanol based MTBE, it was clear, according to
114. See id. at 56.
115. In its Second Amended Statement of Claim, Methanex alleges that these three refining
companies "account[ed] for 55 percent of state gasoline sales." Id. On the other hand, the United
States in its Statement of Defense alleges that, prior to the ban on MTBE sales, the major
integrated refineries in California supplied only fifteen percent of the reformulated gasoline sold
in that State. Supplemental Statement of Defense on Intent of Respondent United States of
America at 23, Methanex Corp. v. United States, 44 I.L.M. 1345 (2005). The remaining eightyfive percent, the United States alleged, was supplied by independent merchant producers of
MTBE, which they then sold to wholesale distributors for insertion into basic gasoline stock to
produce reformulated gasoline. These merchant producers of MTBE engaged in the purchase of
both methanol and butane. They processed the latter into isobutylene, which they then reacted
with methanol to yield MTBE.
116. Second Amended Statement of Claim, supra note 87, at 56 (alteration in original).
117. See id.at57.
118. Id. at 36.
119. Id. at 35.
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Methanex, that ethanol and methanol were competitive products for purposes of the "like circumstances" test under Article 1102(3).12 ° Denial
of that choice, in turn, constituted, in Methanex's view, a blatant act of
discrimination in favor of investors in ethanol production-all of whom
were American-against investors in methanol production-the vast
majority of whom were foreign, a discrimination that patently violated
Article 1102(3) of NAFTA.
Against this record as background, the Tribunal commences what is
essentially a very limited discussion by noting first the United States'
argument that because methanol and ethanol differ chemically and have
different end-uses they are not competitive."2 ' That methanol and ethanol differ in chemical composition is obvious. That therefore they could
not be economically competitive is patently false. Markets the world
over are replete with vigorously competitive products that differ sharply
in their chemical composition, differences that oft-times explain both the
vigor of the competition and the patents and other intellectual property
rights that certify to the chemical difference. To its credit the Tribunal
did not associate itself with this part of the U.S. argument.
The Tribunal did, however, embrace the end-use argument offered
by the United States, stating that
[t]he incontrovertible fact is that Methanex produced methanol as a
feedstock for MTBE and not as a gasoline additive in its own right.
Aside from the federal prohibition of the use of methanol as an oxygenate, methanol has been tried as a fuel in only limited experiments,
but would require, if it were to be used, significant and expensive
retro-adjustments in gasoline engines. As a result, the ethanol and
methanol products cannot be said to be in competition, even assuming that this trade law criterion were to apply. Insofar as there is a
binary choice, it is between MTBE and other lawful and practicable
Methanex's alternative theory of like products fails on
oxygenates.
22
the facts. 1
Note that here the Tribunal acknowledges that MTBE is in competition
with ethanol. Yet, to the Tribunal, the same cannot be said of methanol.
The distinction is disingenuous. MTBE-produced by reacting methanol
with isobutylene-is merely a vehicle used for the purpose of putting
methanol into the gasoline base in order to produce "reformulated" gasoline. The Tribunal explains the technical facts requiring the use of this
vehicle-this extra step.' 23 But the whole purpose, and the only purpose,
for creating the vehicle-MTBE-was to make it possible for methanol
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 125.
Methanex Corp. v. United States, 44 1.L.M. 1345, 1446 (2005).
Id. at 1446.
The extra step also enhances methanol's competitiveness. The chemical conversion of
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to perform precisely the same function as ethanol, namely to increase the
oxygen content of gasoline in order to meet Clean Air Act standards.
Under those standards either methanol or ethanol had to be used. They
were functionally interchangeable. Moreover, to characterize ethanol as
an "end-product" but methanol as only a "feedstock" is totally deceptive. Ethanol is not an "end-product." No one buys "reformulated gasoline" in order to extract the ethanol. The "end-product" is "reformulated
gasoline." Ethanol, like methanol, is "feedstock" to the reformulated
gasoline.
Elsewhere in the record the United States offered a related argument for denying the competitive relationship between methanol and
ethanol. Among Methanex's principal, and possibly only, California
customers were the several large integrated gasoline refineries listed
above, each producing substantial quantities of isobutylene as a by-product of the refining process. Before the ban on MTBE, the refineries purchased methanol from Methanex and other suppliers and reacted the
methanol with isobutylene yielding MTBE, which they then added to the
base gasoline stock. They then sold most of the resulting "reformulated
gasoline" to wholesale distributors for resale to retail gasoline stations.
When, however, the ban on MTBE necessitated the substitution of ethanol for methanol, the large California refineries discontinued adding any
oxygenate to the gasoline stock leaving that task to the distributors who
splash-blended ethanol into the base stock.' 2 4 The reason for this was
plain. Because the solubility of ethanol in water would have denied the
refiners the cost-efficient use of the pipelines for transporting gasoline to
the distributors, they simply declined to add ethanol to the base gasoline
1 25
leaving that task to the distributors.
The United States seized on this fact to argue that because methanol-when legal-was put into the gasoline by the refiners, while ethanol-when replacing methanol-was put in at a different stage in the
supply of reformulated gasoline, methanol and ethanol could not be in
competition. The argument is utterly spurious. Under Article 1102(3) the
competition at issue is not competition between the several stages in the
supply of reformulated gasoline-between refineries, distributors, retailers, etc. The issue is competition between two products-methanol and
ethanol. These are alternative ingredients-"feedstocks"-that perform
the identical function of raising the oxygen content of the gasoline to
levels required by the Clean Air Act. If in performing that function they
methanol from alcohol to either form-the production of MTBE-gives methanol an advantage
over ethanol when the latter is splash blended into the gasoline.
124. Amended Statement of Defense of Respondent United States of America at 66, Methanex,
44 I.L.M. 1345 [hereinafter Amended Statement of Defense].
125. Id.
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compete with each other in the market, that competition exists irrespective of the form in which they were added to the base gasoline stock, the
stage in the production of gasoline at which that addition occurred and
by whom.
Separate from the Final Award's discussion of whether methanol
and ethanol were competitors, was one further incident worth noting. In
April 1999, shortly after adoption of the regulations banning the use of
MTBE by December 31, 2002 (later extended to 2003), Governor Davis
applied to the Administrator of the Federal Environmental Protection
Agency for a waiver from the Federal Clean Air Act regulations to allow
the sale in California of nonoxygenated gasoline. The waiver was necessary, according to the Governor, because, with the ban on MTBE, California would have to turn exclusively to ethanol for the oxygenation of
its gasoline and not enough ethanol was being produced in the United
States to meet California's needs. The Governor's letter explained:
If MTBE is completely phased out of California gasoline. . . and the
federal [reformulated gasoline] mandate is not waived, California
refiners would need as much as 75,000 barrels a day of ethanol to
meet demand .... The United States produces about 80,000 barrels
per day of ethanol to meet current demand for all uses, with another
30,000 barrels per day of spare production currently idle. California
will have to compete with other states if ethanol demand increases
dramatically. 126
Whether he chose to say so or not, practical reality made Governor
Davis recognize that ethanol was a complete and practically the only
substitute for MTBE. 2 7 Since, however, MTBE existed solely to facilitate the use of methanol as an oxygenate for gasoline, the Governor,
effectively had to recognize that under the California ban it was methanol that was being replaced by ethanol in the California gasoline supply.
One could hardly construct a closer and more precise definition of prod12 8
ucts competing in the market place.
126. Second Amended Statement of Claim, supra note 87, at 53.
127. The Governor's request for a waiver was eventually denied.
128. A not dissimilar, although less apparent and certainly unintended, recognition of the
competitive relationship between methanol and ethanol is found elsewhere in the Tribunal's Final
Award. Methanex had argued that the leakage of MTBE from the Underground Storage Tanks
(UST) provided ADM and other ethanol interests a convenient yet utterly irresponsible pretext for
attacking the methanol industry. The Tribunal commented:
The fact that the ethanol industry might see a silver lining in this crisis and
anticipate economic benefits for itself if MTBE were banned from California
reformulated gasoline or that the ethanol industry would support legal measures
designed to accomplish this (since such measures would suit its own interests) is not
by itself proof that California was engaged in a complex covert action whose
objective was to help the ethanol industry and to harm methanol producers by
banning MTBE.
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THE ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSION

There is little doubt that the Methanex case posed substantial diffi-

culties for the Tribunal. The broad economic policy framework relied
upon by Methanex may have appeared to the Tribunal as posing too
grave a risk of giving "national treatment" unexplored parameters,
parameters that could possibly intrude deeply into national sovereignty.
Certainly Methanex's reading of Article 1102(1) intruded sharply on
California's (i.e., United States') sovereignty Westphalian style, as evidenced by the political sensitivity principally, but not exclusively, within
the American environmental community.' 2 9 Perhaps with some justifica30
tion the Tribunal was moved to find an escape.'
If so, the escape was most unfortunate. The scientific record concerning the environmental impact of MTBE, the economic analysis con-

cerning the effects of its elimination, and the record of the intricate
politics surrounding California's ban was more extensive and more carefully constructed than the record developed under any previous Article

1102 challenge by a foreign investor. Credit for this belongs principally
with the Tribunal. And with that record before it the Tribunal had an
unparalleled opportunity to break new and important ground in the interpretation of Article 1102, to firmly yet carefully integrate environmental
considerations into the "like circumstances" inquiry. This the Tribunal
refused to do.
As the record stood, methanol, as the source of oxygen in MTBE,
and ethanol, as a more direct source of oxygen, certainly appeared to be
"in competition" if one relies on the evidence that the Tribunal draws
upon in its Final Award. In that respect, but that respect alone, Methanex
certainly seemed to stand "in like circumstances" with domestic ethanol
Methanex, 44 I.L.M. at 1431. Even if not treated as evidence of "covert action" to harm methanol
producers, one could hardly find a clearer admission that the ban on MTBE would, to any rational
mind, be of economic benefit to the ethanol industry, a "silver lining" to the MTBE leakage
"crisis." One does not use words of this kind to describe disparate and completely noncompetitive
products.
129. The U.S. Trade Representative was citing the case as an example of the abuse to which
some multinational firms had subjected the Chapter 11 grant of direct effect. The environmentalist
community in the United States was up in arms. It saw the case as another egregious example of
multinational corporations using Chapter II to attack national environmental, health, and safety
regulations. Read broadly, since none of the alleged charges leveled at ADM and others in the
ethanol industry consisted of actionable bribery or the violation of any law regulating campaign
contributions, the Methanex assault on that industry seemed to many a gratuitous attack on
everyday practices of the American political process.
130. Here one must observe that the highly crabbed interpretation of Article 1102 offered by
the United States could hardly represent the optimal reading of that provision when one considers
the interests of American investors operating in Mexico and Canada. Surely the alternative
reading suggested here would represent a better balance between the interests of U.S. investors
abroad and protecting regulatory actions by the United States and its constituent states.
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investors. When environmental circumstances are taken into account,
however, that may not have been the case. The record before the Tribunal certainly contained substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion
that when methanol was reacted with isobutylene in order to serve as a
gasoline oxygenate (MTBE), it created an environmental problem not
present with ethanol. Moreover that same record suggests rather convincingly that California, in issuing the ban, was making a scientific,
good-faith, nondiscriminatory response to that same problem. Indeed,
when one considers the Tribunal's very elaborate description of the evidence before it concerning the environmental impact of MTBE, one also
encounters a remarkably diligent and well-balanced review of that
description. Strangely, however, the Tribunal never links up the description nor the review to its analysis under Article 1102(1). Nevertheless,
on the basis of this review, the Tribunal concluded (i) that the ban on
MTBE originated in a policy decision of the California Senate that was
motivated by a good-faith belief that California groundwater was being
contaminated in a manner and to an extent that seriously threatened the
California water supply and would be difficult and expensive to clean
up, (ii) that any action by the California Senate on this belief was
expressly made contingent upon a scientific study by the University of
California, (iii) that in confirming the Senate's belief the University
offered a serious, objective scientific study of a complex problem-a
study tested in public hearings, by peer reviews, and through crossexamination-and (iv) there was no credible evidence that either the
California Senate or the University researchers intended to favor U.S.
ethanol producers or to injure methanol producers, American or foreign. 3' Most importantly, there is no reason to find the Tribunal offering in these conclusions anything other than a careful, fair, and
thoughtful reading of the record before it.
What the Tribunal failed to do was to link up this extended and
carefully crafted portion of its Award with its doctrinal analysis of "like
circumstances"; it failed to consider whether by reason of the scientifically credible difference in environmental effect between methanol/
MTBE and ethanol and California's good-faith response to that difference, the two products, though competitive in the marketplace, were
simply not "in like circumstances" when judged by their divergent
affects on the overall quality of life in California.
Perhaps, in the Tribunal's mind, opening this new and different
doctrinal door looked too much like abandoning the security of legal
formalism for the hazardous slopes of scientific probity and political and
economic policy. There may indeed be something perilous in having
131. Methanex, 44 I.L.M. at 1429.
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"like circumstances" turn on scientific creditability and political good
faith. Nevertheless, the Tribunal's failure to place environmental considerations squarely into the "national treatment" calculus and to articulate
a formula for assaying those considerations was most unfortunate. Harm
to the environment was what the case was all about. The environmental
concerns were objectively genuine. The adverse political reaction to
Methanex's claim was largely a reflection of those concerns. And for the
Tribunal to effectively ignore the problem was to miss an important
opportunity.
It must, of course, be understood that had the Tribunal opened this
new door it would have been propelling "national treatment" analysis
into a region of considerable subtlety. It is not always easy to differentiate between cases in which discriminatory treatment is reflective of
legitimate environmental considerations and cases in which environmental considerations serve only to masque exercises in cynical discrimination. Nor is it always clear how to resolve cases where the balance
between the welfare effects of environmental regulations and the welfare
to be gained, especially by developing countries, from the free play of
competitive markets is completely indeterminate. The GATT experience
with the Article XX environmental exception, for example, is replete
with such cases 132-blatantly protectionist measures masquerading as
environmental initiatives, 3 3 legitimate environmental regulations being
administered in a subtly discriminatory manner, and cases posing an
indeterminate conflict between environmental and economic rationality.
Ironically, despite the Tribunal's affinity for the NAFTA text, it
totally ignored Article 1114(1) regarding environmental concerns. As
part of Chapter 11 that Article provides as follows: "Nothing in this
chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining
or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it
considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory
is
13 4
undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns."'
The key words are: "any measure otherwise consistent with this
132. GATT Article XX(g) provides:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption.
133. GATT, supra note 108, art. XX.
134. North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 7, art. 1114(1).
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Chapter." Plainly, these words mean that environmental limitations
imposed on the free exercise of investors' rights under Chapter 11 do not
automatically prevail over those rights. They must be "otherwise consistent with [that] Chapter." On the other hand, the whole purpose of Article 1114 is to make clear that, on appropriate occasion, limits imposed
for environmental purposes may prevail over investors' Chapter 11
rights. The Article plainly invites some sort of mutual testing or balancing of the environmentally inspired limitations against the value or
weight of the rights that would be constrained. This is precisely the
calculus that governs the case of environmental constraints imposed on
traders in goods under the GATT.
We, of course, are concerned here with NAFTA not GATT. Nevertheless, the fact remains that within the larger body of international economic law, GATT Article XX-especially its "chapeau"-is the most
venerable repository of decisions reconciling the market opening imperatives of that agreement with what is now an ever-increasing body of
environmental constraints on international trade. In the Shrimpffurtle
case,135 the appellate body had the following to say concerning the "chapeau" of GATT Article XX:
[T]hus, a balance must be struck between the right of a [GATT]
Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the duty of that
same Member to respect the treaty rights of the other Members. To
permit one Member to abuse or misuse its right to invoke an exception would be effectively to allow that Member to degrade its own
treaty obligations as well as to devalue the treaty rights of other
Members. If the abuse or misuse is sufficiently grave or extensive,
the Member in effect.., negates altogether the treaty rights of other
Members. The chapeau was installed at the head of the list of "Gen135. Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 8, 1998). The Appellate Body in the Shrimp/Turtle case
explained the chapeau of Article XX in the following terms:
Turning then to the chapeau of Article XX, we consider that it embodies the
recognition on the part of WTO Members of the need to maintain a balance of rights
and obligations between the right of a Member to invoke one or another of the
exceptions of Article XX, specified in paragraphs (a) to (j), on the one hand , and

the substantive rights of the other Members under GATT 1994, on the other hand.
Exercise by one Member of its right too invoke an exception, such as Article XX(g),
if abused or misused will, to that extent, erode or render naught the substantive
treaty rights in, for example , Article XI: 1, of other Members. Similarly, because the
GATI 1994 itself makes available the exceptions of Article XX , in recognition of
the legitimate nature of the policies and interests there embodied , the right to
invoke one of those exceptions is not to be rendered illusory, The same concept may
be expressed from a slightly different angle of vision, thus, a balance must be struck
between the right of a Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the

duty of that same Member to respect the treaty rights of other Members.
Id. 1 156.
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eral Exceptions"
in Article XX to prevent such far reaching
36
consequences. '
Implicit in a thoughtful and purposive interpretation of NAFIA
Article 1114(1), lies a command to undertake a comparable analysis in
cases arising under Article 1102. What makes that analysis especially
difficult is the completely preclusive nature of the California ban on
MTBE. To uphold the ban is to completely destroy Methanex's right, as
an investor in methanol production, to produce and sell its product in
California for use in making MTBE for blending with gasoline stock.
Nevertheless the formula still applies, but one must also be highly sensitive to the complexity involved in implementing that formula. Facially,
it would seem to involve a balancing of the total welfare gained by banning the use of MTBE in California against the welfare lost by that ban.
The calculation, however, is complicated by an intermediate possibility.
Could the welfare lost by the ban on MTBE have been eliminated by a
regulation effectively preventing leakage from underground gasoline
storage tanks? If effective prevention were possible and the cost of prevention less than the welfare lost from the ban, that would seem to merit
an Award declaring the California ban on MTBE in violation of Article
1102(1).
However, before reaching any such conclusion, and in point of fact,
before undertaking any of the analyses implicit in the mandate of Article
1114 and despite the inherent complexity and uncertainty of those analyses, there is an overriding problem. To what extent had the California
authorities already performed something of a comparable analysis? The
University of California study prepared for the California Senate not
only supplied a great deal of information but analyzed that information
in ways that seemed quite compatible with Article 1114. Methanex's
experts also supplied considerable data and an analysis, again apparently
with Article 1114 in mind. Based solely on the evidence summarized in
the Final Award, all of this material leaves the impression, perhaps a
strong impression, that a truly careful Article 1114 analysis would have
merited a decision for the United States. But the Tribunal makes no
move whatsoever to establish whether or not this was the case.
The prospect of such an inquiry, however, raises a basic issue; what
deference, if any, would the Tribunal have owed the conclusions reached
by the California authorities? Were the California calculations conclusive or were they entitled to no deference at all? Alternatively, should
the Tribunal have simply set some methodological standards by which
to judge the creditability of the California authorities' analysis? If so,
what weights were to attach to particular elements in the calculus?
136. Id. T 156.
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Moreover, the only remedy that the Tribunal could order was damages. In doing so, of course, it would have issued a decision declaring
the California ban in violation of NAFTA. But what effect would that
decision have had on California's conduct. Methanex would receive its
damages, but California could not be ordered to terminate the ban. And
Chapter 11 contains no commitment by member nation-states to conform their laws and regulations to arbitral awards. The only means that
the Tribunal had to secure compliance by California with its decision
was the latter's fear of future lawsuits challenging the ban; future suits
by Methanex? Doubtful! Suits by other foreign methanol producers?
Maybe? Or, perhaps the United States would eventually adopt a broader
"foreign policy" of voluntarily complying with such decisions. There
are, in short, genuine limits to a Tribunal's ability to secure Member
compliance with a decision declaring their measures in violation of
investors rights under Chapter 11. Perhaps this limit on its power is a
further reason for any tribunal confronted by a conflict between a
national environmental measure and a foreign investor's claim of right
under Chapter 11, to confine itself solely to insisting first, that the member employ an analysis which in the tribunal's judgment meets the methodological requirements of Article 1114, and, second, that the analysis
conducted in accord with those requirements conform to professional
standards. Perhaps once assured that these points were met, the Tribunal
should be content to defer to the conclusions reached by national authority, always, of course, reserving the right to over-ride any decision that
appears fraudulent, prejudiced, or otherwise unjust. Critically, in short, if
a tribunal feels moved by the complexities and the political, economic,
and other sensitivities of a case to accord a high measure of deference to
national authority, it must honestly acknowledge and justify that action
both in terms of the methodology of Article 1114 and the factual record
of the case. In Methanex, the Tribunal failed utterly to even identify the
analytic process to which it was by NAFTA bound. And when it did
subject the California process to scrutiny, it failed to explain if and precisely how that process did, in fact, meet the requirements of NAFTA.
It was a decision that paid no attention whatsoever to NAFTA, its purposes and its environmental sensibilities. And once again there appears
to be something of the Tribunal's noncontextual formalism at work in
this default. For one thing, a balancing test-the "weighing" of pros and
cons-is noticeably antipositivistic-law without a "rule." But more
than that, the method-"weighing"-threatens to draw the decisionmaker into an utterly indeterminate world of economic, political, and
psychological facts and opinions. Yet, this is precisely the world framed
by NAFITA, a world requiring the Tribunal to leave the comfort of its
noncontextual formalism and venture out into the cold, demanding

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:21

world of judging national authority by the mandated legal fit between its
actions and the attendant social order.
VIII.

ARTICLE 1105 INTERNATIONAL LAW

Methanex claimed that the California ban on MTBE violated the
international-law mandate found in Article 1105(1). Probably the least
important issue judged by the outcome of the case, this claim nevertheless raised some of the more intellectually interesting questions in the
case, questions to which both the United States and the Tribunal
responded in utterly problematic terms, proving again how unpersuasive
the noncontextual formalist method can be whether by way of doctrinal
analysis or textual exegesis.
Article 1105 of NAFTA provides as follows:
1. Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another
Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair
and equitable treatment and full protection and security.
2. Without prejudice to paragraph 1 and notwithstanding Article
1108(7)(b), each Party shall accord to investors of another Party, and
to investments of investors of another Party, non-discriminatory treatment with respect to measures it adopts or maintains relating to losses
suffered by investments in its territory owing to armed conflict or
civil war.
3. Paragraph 2 does not apply to existing measures relating to subsidies or grants that 1would
be inconsistent with Article 1102 but for
37
Article 1108(7)(b).
Methanex, in three admirably short paragraphs, contended that, by its
terms the reference in Paragraph (1) to "international law" and especially the requirement of "fair and equitable treatment," outlawed intentional discrimination because intentional discrimination was by
definition "inequitable." Then, Methanex added, the factual demonstration already submitted under Article 1102 established a violation of Article 1105(1) by showing that the ban on MTBE was intended to
discriminate against Methanex and other foreign methanol producers.
The United States answered first with an inconclusive argument
based on Paragraph (3) of the FTC "interpretation."' 38 It then offered a
137. North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 7, art. 1105.
138. There are two points to be made here. First, when the Tribunal came to considering the
United States' argument, it had already determined that the California ban on MTBE did not
violate Article 1102. At that point, in other words, there was no Article 1102 "determination" of
breach and certainly Paragraph (3) of the FTC "interpretation" does not say that a "determination"
of "no breach" of Article 1102 automatically establishes "no-breach" under Article 1105. Second,
the United States' construction of Paragraph (3) is not a necessary interpretation. Assume that the
word "determination" means a decision by a Chapter 11 tribunal. Accordingly, if a tribunal
decides that Article 1102 has been breached, all that Paragraph (3) of the "interpretation" would
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far more cogent argument invoking Article 1108 of NAFTA, but an
argument largely ignored by the Tribunal.1 39 Lastly, in what was clearly
the gravamen of its defense, the United States charged that Methanex
had "failed to carry its burden of proving" first that the rule of "customary international law" upon which it relied actually existed and second
that the supposed rule had in fact been violated.14 0 In dealing with the
discourse on these points it is well to remember that according to the
FTC "interpretation," which we are bound to take as authoritative, the

reference in Article 1105(1) to "international law" is exclusively a reference to "customary international law."
In elaborating its argument, the United States, backed by impressive authority, made the critical point that "customary international law
contains no general prohibition on economic discrimination against
aliens,"" ' including presumably "intentional discrimination." Anything

to the contrary would result, according to the United States, in "sacrificing important community values."' 142 As proof of this basic assertion the
United States' alluded to "State practice." Without being charged with

violating international law, many nations, for example, imposed "onerous restrictions ... on [alien] property," even to the point of excluding
necessarily say is that the Article 1102 breach cannot automatically trigger a breach of Article
1105. This is a minimum construction of Paragraph (3). Then, Paragraph (3) would not prohibit
facts, used once to determine that Article 1102 had been breached, from being used again to
decide independently whether a violation had occurred under the separate criteria of Article 1105.
And this latter certainly has merit since there is no intrinsic reason why nationality-based
discriminatory practices that offend Article 1102 cannot also be culpable under Article 1105. This
is all the more telling when it is remembered that in its Article 1102 ruling the Tribunal only
extended national treatment protection to foreign investors whose products were identical to the
"domestic comparator," leaving unprotected under that Article foreign investors with nonidentical but competitive products. These are investors who, consistent with the basic purposes
and the economic principles underlying the "national treatment" requirement, should have been
prime candidates for protection under Article 1102.
139. The United States argued that insofar as Article 1108, in its list of exceptions to the rules
prohibiting nationality-based discrimination, lists only Articles 1102 and 1103, not Article 1105.
That indicates that the latter Article cannot be interpreted as a source of a rule prohibiting
nationality-based discrimination such as the "national treatment" requirement. This follows
because the Article 1108 exceptions, which are many, are generally understood as allowing
member governments to engage in any and all forms of discrimination against foreign investors,
foreign goods, or other foreign interests that were otherwise subject to a rule of
"nondiscrimination" under NAFTA. If, on the other hand, nationality-based discrimination was, as
Methanex argued, covered by Article 1105(1) and Article 1105(1) was not listed among the
Article 1108 exceptions, which, the United States contended, would completely nullify the Article
1108 exceptions for Article 1102 (national treatment) and Article 1103 (MFN). In other words, the
very existence of Article 1108 with no mention of Article 1105(1) indicates that the latter
contained no rule prohibiting nationality -based discrimination-no "national treatment"
requirement. The Tribunal made no mention of this argument.
140. Amended Statement of Defense, supra note 124, at 146.
141. Id. at 155.
142. Id. at 156.
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aliens from "certain occupations" or from "enumerated business enterprises" or from living in or owning property in "certain geographical
areas" or from "own[ing] [any] real property" at all. 143 On the other
hand, "customary international law" did, according to the United States,
establish that certain forms of discrimination did violate that law. Very
limited,"4 these proscriptions simply did not apply to Methanex's claim.
With this contention the United States effectively posed the most
salient issue raised by Methanex's attempt to invoke Article 1105(1). It
starts from the premise that it would be difficult to prove that economic
discrimination against aliens, either broadly conceived or more particularly as a denial of "national treatment," would violate "customary international law." In saying this we do not rely on any purported failure of
the nondiscrimination principle to qualify as a traditional opinio juris.
Anthony D'Amato has shown that as a requisite for proof of customary
law, opiniojurisis fatally circular. 145 We follow, instead, the suggestion
by Andrew Guzman that "customary law" should be defined more in
terms of community expectations; that a "state faces a norm of [customary international law] if other states believe that the state has such an
obligation and if those other states will view a failure to honor that obli' 46
gation as a violation."'
Yet, even after rejecting the quid pro quo argument, the picture
remains complicated. The extraordinary extension of "national treatment" evidenced by the signature of the BITS and other agreements is
compromised by the fact that virtually every such agreement contains
lists, sometimes extensive lists, reserving the right of a particular signatory to continue denying "national treatment" to specific types of investments from one or more other signatories. NAFTA is no exception from
this compromising tendency. Not infrequently the agreement may place
limits, including term limits, on the reserved right to discriminate or
promise to administer the discrimination more fairly and with greater
transparency. Nevertheless, it is still the reservation of a right to
discriminate.
These reservations, in turn, illustrate just how persistent nationstates can be in their desire to disadvantage foreign capital competitively
143. Id. at 159.
144. (i) Expropriations, (ii) "denials of justice" especially denials of access to judicial
remedies, and (iii) protection from "mob violence, armed conflict, or civil strife." These examples,
however, were apparently the limit of what customary law prohibited. See id. at 160-61.
145. How can custom create new law if its critical psychological component-the
"recognition" of a legal obligation-requires action in conscious accordance with existing law?
See ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6-10 (1971).
146. Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of InternationalLaw, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1823, 1876 (2002).
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when it enters the domestic market. This is precisely the anticompetitive
persistence that Article 1102(1) was designed to contain. And it is precisely this persistence that underscores the difficulty of attributing to the
otherwise nominal grants of "national treatment" contained in these
agreements, evidence of a sufficient global expectation to constitute the
hallmark of a "customary" norm. Indeed, the contradiction is widespread
enough to suggest that "national treatment" for foreign investors will,
for the indefinite future, be confined by international practice to an alternative system where growth in the law is consigned exclusively to the
negotiation and enforcement of written agreements.
If correct in this, our argument supplies the final and definitive
grounds for rejecting Methanex's attempt, by invoking Article 1105(1),
to enlist the support of customary international law. On the other hand, if
we are wrong, and "national treatment" is indeed a rule of customary
law, the question in the Methanex case becomes whether the rule was in
fact violated. And here the answer from our discussion under Article
1102(1) seems plain. Based on what we know from the Tribunal's Final
Award, if "national treatment" is a recognized norm of customary law,
the California ban on MTBE did indeed violate Article 1105(1), unless
by reason of environmental considerations it qualified as an exception
under Article 1114.
Unfortunately, neither the Tribunal nor the United States in its
Statement of Defense made any effort to explore forthrightly whether a
violation of "national treatment" constituted a violation of customary
international law. Nor was either willing to adopt the simple device of
accepting that contention arguendo and then dismissing Methanex's
Article 1105(1) claim on the ground it had failed to prove a violation of
"national treatment" under Article 1102(1). Recall, Methanex itself had
rested its Article 1105(1) "international law" claim on the evidence
pleaded under Article 1102(1) and the Tribunal had already dismissed
the latter claim. Instead both the Tribunal and the United States contrived with arguments problematic and occasionally deceptive to avoid
not only the question of whether "national treatment" constituted a norm
of customary law but also whether California's ban on MTBE violated
that norm.
The United States, in a gross mischaracterization of the Methanex
claim, argued that the "only genre of discrimination alleged by
Methanex" was "discrimination against foreign-produced goods in favor
of domestically produced goods."' 14 7 To remove all doubt as to what the
United States meant, it added that Methanex had not been deprived of
national treatment because it "[h]ad not received less favorable treat147. Amended Statement of Defense, supra note 124, at 163.
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ment than similarly-situated U.S. producers of methanol."' 48 This is
manifestly false. The "genre of discrimination alleged by Methanex,"
was discrimination against foreign methanol in favor of domestic ethanol, not discrimination against foreign methanol in favor of domestic
methanol. Only by reason of this mischaracterization could the United
States presume to conclude that Methanex had not been deprived of
"national treatment."
The Tribunal, on the other hand, was somewhat more forthright.
Having noted that the FTC interpretation does not exclude nondiscrimination entirely from Chapter 11, it added that all the "FTC's interpretation of Article 1105 does, in this regard, is [sic] to confine claims based
on alleged discrimination to Article 1102, which offers full play for a
principle of non-discrimination."'4 9
The claim that Article 1102 "offers full play" to the principle of
nondiscrimination is simply not true if one follows the Tribunal's interpretation of that Article. Recall, the Tribunal insisted that only technical
product identity or other similarity, and not market competition, could
serve as a basis for determining whether domestic and foreign investors
were in "like circumstances" sufficient to assure Article 1102(1) protection for the latter. This is scarcely giving Article 1102(1) "full play."
More importantly, this delimitation of Article 1102(1) represents a
fundamental abrogation of the purposes and the underlying dynamics
essential for its "national treatment" mandate to qualify as a norm of
customary international law. The point is axiomatic. International capital
flows can be critical to achieving the welfare gains from comparative
advantage that are the first line objective of NAFTA, the BITS, and
other agreements containing guaranteed investor rights. Those capital
flows, in turn, are entirely dependent upon the ability of foreign investors to compete in the domestic-capital market. And "national treatment"
is designed to assure that governments do not prejudice that competition.
That assurance alone explains why so many agreements mandate
"national treatment" and why those agreements, if sufficiently widespread without excessive reservations, may be thought adequate to qualify those mandates as reflective of customary law. The Tribunal,
however, trapped by its noncontextual formalist proclivities ignores the
vital importance that competition plays in furthering the policy objectives of Article 1102(1), and opts instead for an essentially meaningless
product identity test, thereby stripping "national treatment" of the very
dynamics essential to its acceptance as customary law, all without even
addressing the issue.
148. Id. at 165.
149. Methanex Corp. v. United States, 44 I.L.M. 1454, 1446 (2005) (emphasis added).
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To support this apparent need to get rid of the bothersome question
of whether "national treatment" could qualify as a rule of customary
law, the Tribunal reverts to a traditional noncontextual formalist tactic.
Totally without regard to the underlying economic or political objectives
of the ordinance in question, the Tribunal offers an abstract textual exegesis designed to show that Article 1105(1) was totally devoid of any
reference to nondiscrimination, including "national treatment." For this
purpose, it makes two interpretive moves.
First, it noted that paragraph (2) of Article 1105 expressly required
nondiscrimination in administering aid for wartime investment losses
but that paragraph (1), upon which Methanex based its case, made no
reference whatsoever to "nondiscrimination." Relying upon the interpretive canon inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (words included in one
provision but not in another must be construed as intentionally omitted
from the latter), the Tribunal concluded that, when the framers of
NAFTA in mandating international law in paragraph (2) expressly
referred to nondiscrimination, but when referring to international law
generally in paragraph (1), omitted any mention of nondiscrimination,
they signaled a deliberate decision to exclude "nondiscrimination" as a
50
norm from that paragraph.
This interpretive move is problematic at best. First of all, context
strongly suggests that the mere mention of "nondiscrimination" in Paragraph (2), combined with the failure to mention that principle in Paragraph (1), implied no affirmative decision whatsoever to exclude it from
the international law otherwise applicable under the latter. Paragraph (2)
does not apply or otherwise refer to international law, whether conventional or customary. It deals with potential subsidies and other government aids for wartime investment losses. The NAFTA draftsmen clearly
wanted those aids to be administered in a nondiscriminatory manner
regardless of whether international law required it or not. It was, therefore, absolutely necessary to expressly mention that fact. But that necessity alone is sufficient to explain why nondiscrimination is mentioned in
Paragraph (2) and not mentioned in Paragraph (1). It was absolutely necessary to (2) but not to (1) if nondiscrimination is part of the customary
international law expressly referred to in that Paragraph. That explanation, in turn, eliminates any grounds for implying that the draftsmen, by
their reference to nondiscrimination in paragraph (2), meant thereby to
strip the international law they were applying in paragraph (1) of any
5
rule of nondiscrimination that would otherwise be part of that law.1 '
Once the reference to "nondiscrimination" in one paragraph is explained
150. Id. at 1452.
151. This is a complex issue that is far from self-evident.
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by an independent reason, its absence in another paragraph looses any
negative implication it might otherwise have had. Again, careful regard
to context shows how inappropriate, even dangerous, the traditional
"canons" of construction can be.
Even more telling, Paragraph (2) is expressly prefaced by the words
"Without prejudice to paragraph 1." It's as though the draftsmen anticipated the Tribunal's argument and expressly disclaimed any such
implied intention. Presumably nothing said in Paragraph (2) was to
"prejudice" the content of what was said in Paragraph (1), nothing to
"prejudice" the content of "international law" as traditionally understood. But that's exactly what the Tribunal will have done by writing
"nondiscrimination" and with it the "national treatment" mandate completely out of Paragraph (1), if it can be shown that discrimination
against foreign investors would violate customary law.
As a second interpretive move, the Tribunal sought to reinforce its
first move by going to Article 1110(1). That Article provides that for an
expropriation of a foreign investor's property to be legal it must, inter
alia, be:
(a) for a public purpose,
(b) on a nondiscriminatory basis,
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1),
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2
through 6.
The two requirements-nondiscrimination and the requirements of Article 1105(1)-are placed in separate sub-paragraphs. From this the Tribunal reasons that had the draftsmen thought that "nondiscrimination"
was covered under sub-paragraph (c) by the reference to "international
law" under Article 1105(1) they would not have had to specifically mention it in a separate sub-paragraph (b). 152 The Tribunal then concludes:
This is not an instance of textual ambiguity or lacuna which invites a
tribunal even to contemplate making law. When the NAFTA Parties
did not incorporate a non-discrimination requirement in a provision
in which they might have done so, it would be wrong for a tribunal to
pretend that they had. Thus, even if Methanex had succeeded in
establishing that it had suffered a discrimination for its claim under
Article 1102, it would not be admissible for it, as a matter of textual
interpretation, to establish a claim under Article 1105.153
Article 1 110(1) reflects a view of nation-state responsibility that,
for at least the last eighty years, the United States had championed as a
rule of customary international law. It can be read as a substantial relin152. Methanex, 44 I.L.M. at 1452-53.
153. Id. at 1453.
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quishment by Mexico of its historical advocacy of the so-called Calvo
doctrine 154 and would appear to expand the rights of foreign investors
well beyond those traditionally recognized by Canada.
As a statement of the traditional United States position, Article
1110(1) quite naturally restates all of the principal elements of that position in separate paragraphs (a) to (d). Without evidence to the contrary
we must assume that this format was adopted for purposes of clarity and
a draftsman's sense of good order. But now the Tribunal turns this format into a substantive maneuver. It strips the concept of "nondiscrimination" in sub-paragraph (b) completely out of the "international law"
applied under the reference in sub-paragraph (c) to Article 1105(1). If,
according to the Tribunal, this is the necessary effect of sub-paragraph
(b), the same must be true of sub-paragraphs (a) and (d). They must strip
out of the reference to "international law" in sub-paragraph (c), the
requirement that an expropriation be for a "public purpose" (sub-paragraph (a)) and with full compensation (sub-paragraph (d)). This alone
effectively leaves the reference to "international law" in sub-paragraph
(c) stripped of all the basic elements of the traditional United States
position on expropriations. What's left looks like a stripped down
"catch-all" for such additional points of international law as might
become relevant (e.g., exhaustion of remedies, criteria for a "denial of
justice").
Now, however, the Tribunal makes a remarkable move. It takes the
stripped-down version of "international law" in Article 1110(c), which,
by its manipulations, it has reduced to a "catch-all" for expropriation
cases and substitutes that truncated version for the straight forward reference to "international law" found in Article 1105(1), itself applicable to
any injury to a foreign investor in violation of that law. Even if one
concedes the Tribunal's somewhat problematic assertion that by the separate reference to "nondiscrimination" in sub-paragraph (b) of Article
1110(1), the "NAFTFA Parties" consciously declined to "incorporate a
non-discrimination requirement in a provision in which they might have
done so" (i.e., in sub-paragraph (c)), this doesn't explain why the
unqualified reference to "international law" in Article 1105(1) proper
should suddenly be reduced to the truncated version contrived as a mere
"catch-all" for expropriation cases under Article 1110. Why should
Methanex be saddled with a definition of "international law" designed
for judging the legality of an expropriation? Methanex was not invoking
Article 1105(1) proper, as a remedy for an expropriation. It was invok154. See generally Justine Daly, Has Mexico Crossed the Border on State Responsibilityfor
Economic Injury to Aliens? ForeignInvestment and the Calvo Clause in Mexico After the NAFTA,
25 ST. MARY's L.J. 1147 (1994) (discussing Mexico's adherence to the Calvo doctrine).
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ing Article 1105(1) proper to ground a claim of discrimination because it
violated the "national treatment" guaranteed by international law. It may
be that the "national treatment" does not qualify as a rule of customary
international law. That's a separate and real issue. But it is utterly
bizarre to take the stripped-down version of "international law" contrived for expropriation cases under Article 1110(l)(c) in order to strip
out from the general reference to international law in Article 1105(1),
all
155
possibility of sustaining a claimed denial of "national treatment."'
IX.

EXPROPRIATION IN VIOLATION OF

NAFTA Article 1110

As its final claim Methanex, very succinctly, charged that the California ban on MTBE was a "taking" of its property that violated the
requirements of Article 1110. The property "taken" by the ban was
Methanex's California customer base, its share of the California oxygenate market and the good will that it lost. The loss suffered was a "regulatory taking,"-what under Article 1110 qualified as "tantamount to an
expropriation"-because, under the test laid down in the Metalclad case,
Methanex was "deprived of all or a significant part of the reasonably
expected economic benefits" of the property in question. To this
Methanex added that because the purpose of the ban was to take the
California oxygenate market away from one group of private investors
(i.e., the foreign methanol producers) and give it to another group of
private investors (i.e., domestic ethanol producers) it did not serve a
"public purpose" as required by Article 11 10(1)(a) and that as a discriminatory measure it violated the customary international law mandate of
Article 1105 made applicable by Article 11l0(1)(c). Finally, in
Methanex's view, as victim of a "regulatory taking" it was entitled under
Article 11 10(1)(d) to full compensation for its loss which obviously had
not been paid.
In response the Tribunal offers a number of casual observations all
of which cast doubt on Methanex's case but provide nothing like defini155. Picking-up on the United States' argument, the Tribunal also offered the broad
proposition that States are completely free to "differentiate in [their] treatment of nationals and
aliens" unless bared from doing so by "a contrary rule of international law . . . whether of
conventional or customary origin." Methanex, 44 I.L.M. at 1454. It then notes that customary
international law has established a number of such exceptions. but that, according to the
International Court of Justice, the Party relying on any such exception has responsibility for
establishing that it "has become binding on the other Party." Id. Turning then to Methanex, the
Tribunal notes that the only authority offered by Methanex for the proposition that

"nondiscrimination"-presumably in the form of "national treatment"-is a component of

customary international law was an extended citation from the Chapter 11 arbitration in Waste
Management, Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/003, June 26, 2002. The Tribunal found

this far from an adequate demonstration that the discrimination of which Methanex complained
constituted a violation of customary international law. Methanex, 44 I.L.M. at 1454.
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tive grounds for rejecting Methanex's claim.' 5 6 Then, quite surprisingly,
it offers the definitive grounds for dismissing Methanex's Article
1110(1) claim in the following terms:
In the Tribunal's view, Methanex is correct that an intentionally discriminatory regulation against a foreign investor fulfills a key
requirement for establishing expropriations. But as a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a public
purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process and, which
affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed
expropriatory and compensable unless specific commitments had
been given by the regulating government to the then putativeforeign
investor contemplating5 investment
that the government would refrain
7
from such regulation.'

As with virtually all other tribunals, judicial or arbitral, domestic or
international, the Methanex Tribunal faced a complicated problem. Historically, expropriatory actions by national governments where the owners claimed a right to compensation involved the actual assumption by
the government of physical possession or the sole rights of ownership of
the property in question-what the Tribunal called "expropriation simpliciter."' 58 Against this particular form of governmental action the capital-exporting countries promoted a strong legal tradition, both
international and domestic, of requiring the government to pay full compensation to the owner. While the international version of that requirement was challenged particularly by the developing countries in the
United Nations General Assembly, it nevertheless seemed to retain its
vitality among the various tribunals that were from time to time called to
pass on the issue.
It was against this background that the developing countries
increasingly found it in their interests to use regulatory intervention,
rather than an outright "taking," to achieve their purposes. This
included, but was never limited to, amending existing concession agreements to increase the host government's share of the profits. The
response of the industrial countries was predictable. "Regulatory tak156. It ambiguously casts doubt on whether customer base, market share, and good will can
ever be considered "property" to serve as the object of a regulatory taking. These elements of loss,

the Tribunal seems to say, might better be used in calculating damages once a "regulatory taking"
is established. It also makes much of the fact that Methanex entered the United States market
where it was "notorious" that not only governmental agencies, state and federal, but also media,
corporations, NGO's, "and a politically active electorate [that] continuously monitored the use and
impact of chemical compounds and commonly prohibited or restricted [their use] .. . for
environmental and/or health reasons." Methanex, 44 I.L.M. at 1456. Consistent with its earlier
findings, the Tribunal dismisses what it calls Methanex's "conspiratorial thesis" concerning
California's object in banning MTBE and promoting the use of ethanol. See id. at 1437.
157. Id. at 1456 (emphasis added).
158. Id.
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ing," they contended, was as much an expropriation as the outright
assumption of a possessory or ownership right and the private owner had
to be compensated for any loss attributable to the regulation. This, however, created a problem as much for them as for the developing countries
in which their capital was being invested. The modem nation-state
engages in regulating private capital within their boundaries sometimes
quite strictly. And in all nation-states regulation frequently entails financial loss to the private entrepreneur being regulated. Yet, if governments
had to compensate for all such losses all of the time, the budgetary consequences would cause many governments to forego issuing otherwise
vital regulations. The modem State, especially the State committed to
protecting the health and safety of the mass of its population, would be
crippled by any such sweeping international legal requirement, a point
argued strongly by the United States in the Methanex case.
On the other hand, the protection of private capital, especially foreign-owned private capital, against overreaching and, at times, politically opportunistic regulation remains as necessary today as at any time
in the past. Plainly, in other words, this is an area of the law requiring
from judges and arbitrators alike a carefully crafted, balanced set of criteria for discerning precisely the circumstances to guide in drawing a
line that will, on one hand, secure to economic activity, both within and
outside a nation, its service to the public welfare while, at the same time,
retaining to each nation's entrepreneurial spirit the full force of the
incentives without which that spirit will inevitably languish and die. The
definition of such a line is still very much in the experimental stage, and
tribunals, such as the Tribunal in the Methanex case, have what may be
thought of as a standing invitation to join the experimental process.
But it is precisely here that the Tribunal disappoints. It adverts to
what can only be seen as a noncontextual formalist-inspired retreat from
the challenge posed by the case presented to it. Once again the Tribunal,
in an apparent search for noncontextual formalist predictability, utterly
ignores, indeed offends, a fundamental purpose of NAFTA, especially of
Chapter 11. Moved to enhance the welfare gains that comparative
advantage promises, NAFTA clearly announces its purpose to facilitate
the movement of capital between member nation-states, particularly, of
course, capital from the United States and Canada to Mexico. This is the
gravamen of Chapter 11. Yet, the Tribunal offers an interpretation of
Article 1110(1) that could hardly pose a more insistent barrier to facilitating that purpose. If accepted as the dominant interpretation, it means
that every investor is completely deprived of any protection against regulatory invasions of its property unless before making its investment it
has gone to the host government "hat in hand" and asked for an agree-
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ment guarantying that its investment would experience no such loss.
Since the Tribunal was clearly wrong in attributing the required preinvestment agreement to current "customary international law," and presumably because Article 1110(1) supersedes any protection the investor
might otherwise have obtained from customary international law, the
Tribunal's holding could mean that all NAFTA investors hereafter who
do not apply for or fail to obtain any such agreement would be stripped
by the treaty of any right to invoke the protection of customary international law. That alone will discourage many a prospective investor from
risking any significant transfer of capital from one to another Member.
Moreover, the need to apply for the "permission to sue" issued by the
government to be sued can all too readily be turned into a broader preinvestment approval process, a process that the framers of NAFTA
fought vigorously to eliminate.
X.

CONCLUSION

NAFTA plainly shows where we must go in achieving a new, more
effective and democratically controlled system of governance for the
global economy. But that comer of the NAFTA experience represented
by the Methanex case reminds us of the distance we have yet to go in
fulfillment of that vision. Juxtaposed to NAFTA as harbinger of a new
order, stands the grim triumvirate of traditional Westphalian conception
of nation-state sovereignty, the political realists' theoretical construction
of the international order, and the noncontextual formalist's theory of
legal method.
The Tribunal, through its decision in the Methanex case, illustrates
with remarkable consistency the central role that the noncontextual formalist legal method can play in a defense against NAFTA's new order.
The critical consequence of the Tribunal's use of the noncontextual formalist method lies in removing the issues needing resolution from the
practical purposes of the ordinance in question and from the economic,
political, and cultural predicates used to both identify and shape the
answers to those issues. Apparently driven by a majestic vision of law as
pure essence, uncorrupted by social reality and the sometimes messy and
always ambiguous context that energizes the need for and lends shape to
the law, the Tribunal demonstrates rather dramatically how its vision of
law provides the first line of defense in preserving both the traditional
version of State sovereignty and the political realist theory of the international order, despite, in case of the latter, the contrasting force of
"direct effect." All of this emerges with startling transparency from the
Tribunal's refusal to place both its own jurisdiction and the "national
treatment" requirement into the context of NAFTA's central economic
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predicates, its inexplicable avoidance of the environmental issue raised
by the sheer fact that it was an environmental measure that gave rise to
the law suit, its, at times, careless use of text, and its willingness to
embrace interpretations without regard for the operational consequences
of its reading. In sum, NAFTA and more importantly its member nationstates were ill served by the decision in the Methanex case.

